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JESSICA A. ROTH* 
This Article examines how prosecutors convey to various audiences 
their decisions not to charge in discrete cases.  Although prosecutors 
regularly issue public statements about their declinations—and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that declination statements are on the rise—there is an 
absence of literature discussing the interests that such statements serve, the 
risks that they pose, and how such statements are consistent with the 
prosecutorial function.  Prosecutors also operate in this space without clear 
ground rules set by law, policies, or professional standards.  This Article 
attempts to fill that void.  First, it theorizes the interests potentially advanced 
by such statements—characterized as signaling, accountability, and history-
keeping—and their drawbacks.  Next, it describes the current landscape of 
prosecutorial policies and practices on declination statements and shows 
how prosecutors would benefit from a more express framework of analysis.  
Finally, it offers such a framework to assist prosecutors in deciding when 
and how to issue declination statements.  That framework suggests that 
prosecutors should only issue public declination statements when doing so 
significantly furthers one or more of the interests identified herein, where the 
risks posed by such statements are minimized, and where their value cannot 
be realized through other available means, including other types of 
statements. 
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INTRODUCTION  
One of the most important aspects of the prosecutorial function is the 
prosecutor’s discretion not to pursue criminal charges in discrete cases.  The 
exercise of negative discretion—i.e., the choice not to charge, even where the 
evidence might be sufficient—is a necessary feature of our system, and a 
reason why good judgment and common sense are so valuable as 
prosecutorial traits.1  Outside of a few core offenses, it is not credible to claim 
that prosecutors charge every provable case brought to their attention.2  
Prosecutorial discretion mitigates “the rigors of the penal system,”3 by 
“blunting the edges”4 of overly harsh or broad laws.  In an era of expansive 
criminal law and finite government resources, declinations constitute an ever 
 
 1 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 369, 370 (2010) (“Even in a world of unlimited resources and sane criminal 
codes, discretion would be essential to doing justice. Justice requires not only rules but also 
fine-grained moral evaluations and distinctions.”); Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative 
Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1662–63 
(2010) (the notion that prosecutors should rigidly apply the criminal law is “both untenable 
and unattractive” and almost universally rejected in “case law and commentary”); Zachary S. 
Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 745 (2014) (“the 
breadth and depth of substantive [criminal] law . . . presumes a regime in which executive 
officials exercise discretion to moderate the rigors of statutory prohibitions, thereby creating 
a law on the ground that more closely approximates popular preferences than the law on the 
books.”); see also A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, r. 
3-1.2(b) (“The prosecutor serves the public interest and should act with integrity and balanced 
judgment to increase public safety both by pursuing appropriate criminal charges of 
appropriate severity, and by exercising discretion not to pursue criminal charges in appropriate 
circumstances.”). 
 2 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on the 
Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600, 605 (2005). 
 3 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004). 
 4 David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 473, 506 (2016). 
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more significant piece of the criminal justice picture,5 even if the precise size 
of that piece is unknown.6 
Yet, the question of how and to what extent prosecutors should be held 
accountable for their exercise of negative discretion has not received 
sufficient attention.  Historically, prosecutors rarely accounted for their 
declination decisions.7  This was consistent with the overall lack of 
prosecutorial accountability and transparency,8 which for many years went 
largely unchallenged.  Unlike when they file charges,9 prosecutors generally 
 
 5 As Dan Markel observed, “the scope of prosecutorial declinations is often 
underappreciated.” Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1439 n.57 (2004). 
 6 See BESIKI LUKA KUTATELADZE & NANCY R. ANDILORO, PROSECUTION AND RACIAL 
JUSTICE IN NEW YORK COUNTY–TECHNICAL REPORT, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE vi–vii 
(2014); see also Eric Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
785, 795 (2012) (estimating “[a]s a rule of thumb, 25%–50% of all cases referred to 
prosecutors are declined for prosecution”). Rates vary depending on the jurisdiction and the 
type of case, and federal declination rates are generally higher. See Ronald Wright & Marc 
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 75 (2002). In the Vera 
Institute study of the Manhattan District Attorney’s office, investigators found that 
approximately 6% of felony cases, 4% of misdemeanor cases, and 11% of violations were 
declined for prosecution when initially presented to prosecutors by police. Dismissal rates for 
felonies and misdemeanors were considerably higher at subsequent stages of the criminal 
process, up to 36% of felonies and 18% of misdemeanors, excluding cases adjourned in 
contemplation of dismissal. Dismissals in cases involving domestic violence were particularly 
high.  See KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra. 
 7 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 6, at 797–801 (bemoaning the “covert” and “opaque” nature 
of prosecutorial declinations, which have “hidden” the prosecutor’s decision-making process 
“from the general population and those individuals subject to its strictures”); Austin Sarat & 
Conor Clarke, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, The Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits of 
Law, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 387, 393 (2008) (“[H]istorically, [declination] decisions have 
been made with little or no legal oversight.”). 
 8 See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 5 (2007) (observing that prosecutors’ charging decisions “are totally 
discretionary and virtually unreviewable. Prosecutors make the most important of [their] 
discretionary decisions behind closed doors and answer only to other prosecutors.”); Rachel 
E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989 (2006) (same); 
Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PENN. 
L. REV. 959 (2009) (discussing lack of checks on prosecutorial power). 
 9 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (requiring an indictment or information to be a written 
statement); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f) (requiring the grand jury to return the indictment to a 
magistrate judge “in open court”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(4) (stating that the magistrate “may 
direct that the indictment be kept secret until the defendant is in custody or has been released 
pending trial”); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 200.10 (2018) (defining an indictment as “a written 
accusation by a grand jury, filed with a superior court, charging a person, or two or more 
persons jointly, with the commission of a crime . . . .”). 
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are under no legal duty to make public their declinations.10  But prosecutors 
also had particular reasons to keep mum about declination decisions, 
including their duty as “ministers of justice”11 to protect the privacy interests 
of those who had been under investigation, as well as witnesses and victims.12  
Other interests, too, explained the reticence to go public with such decisions, 
including protecting ongoing investigations13 and prosecutors’ prospective 
ability to exercise mercy without fear of political reprisal.14  Today, for these 
same reasons, it is still true that prosecutors generally do not explain 
individual declination decisions, at least to a public audience.  Most of the 
time, when an investigation is closed without the filing of charges, 
 
 10 As Ronald Wright and Marc Miller have observed, declinations may be viewed as “the 
height of prosecutorial discretion . . . prosecutors do not have to state their reasons in open 
court or in any other setting outside their own offices. Indeed, in some jurisdictions the 
prosecutors may not have to record their reasons anywhere or explain their reasons to anyone, 
even to themselves.” Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 
125, 133 (2008); see also Vincent Chiao, Ex Ante Fairness in Criminal Law and Procedure, 
15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 277, 280 (2012) (prosecutors generally are not “required to state 
reasons for pursuing some [cases] while declining others.”). Indeed, even statutes conferring 
rights on crime victims do not require that prosecutors disclose to victims a decision to decline 
to charge. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2015) (conferring upon crime victims various rights, 
including to be kept informed of any public court proceedings and to be heard at such hearings, 
and to kept informed of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement). A small number 
of jurisdictions require prosecutors to file a brief court document when they decline a charge 
in a case initiated by police. See infra, note 198. 
 11 The American Bar Association describes the prosecutor as “a minister of justice,” who 
accordingly has responsibilities that go beyond those of an ordinary advocate. See MODEL 
CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2018) [hereinafter A.B.A., Rule 3.8]. These 
responsibilities include “specific obligations to see that the defendant is accorded procedural 
justice [and] that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient evidence.” Id. As Justice George 
Sutherland famously wrote of the prosecutor’s special role, the prosecutor is “the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation 
to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, 
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.” 
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 12 As then Assistant Attorney General Philip Heymann told a Congressional Committee 
in 1980, the Department of Justice “as an agency following the rule of law . . . [has] no 
business broadcasting our ‘suspicions’ or ‘hunches’ about guilt.” MARC L. MILLER & RONALD 
F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: PROSECUTION AND ADJUDICATION 144 (3d ed. 2007); see 
also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE MANUAL at § 1-7.100 - General Need for Confidentiality 
[hereinafter DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL] (“Disseminating non-public, sensitive information about 
DOJ matters could violate . . . privacy rights,” “put a witness or law enforcement officer in 
danger,” or “unfairly damage the reputation of a person.”). 
 13 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 1-7.100 (dissemination of non-public 
information also could “jeopardize an investigation or case”). 
 14 See Daniel C. Richman, Accounting for Prosecutors, in PROSECUTORS AND 
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY 40, 48 (Maximo Langer & David Sklansky eds., 
2017). 
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prosecutors do not account for that decision in a way that is accessible to the 
public.15 
But occasionally prosecutors deviate from this norm, and anecdotal 
evidence suggests that such occasions are increasing.16  These gestures 
toward transparency are invariably fraught.  For example, then-FBI Director 
James Comey’s now infamous July 2016 press conference announcing his 
decision not to recommend charges against Hillary Clinton for her use of a 
personal email server while serving as Secretary of State generated 
considerable controversy—especially his characterization of her behavior as 
“extremely careless.”17  Similarly, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance 
was widely criticized for his 2017 letter announcing his decision not to seek 
charges against New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio for fundraising-related 
activity, in which he nevertheless characterized the conduct as inconsistent 
with the spirit of the law.18  In 2019, Special Counsel Robert Mueller’s report 
regarding his investigation of coordination between Donald Trump’s 2016 
Presidential Campaign and Russian officials and related matters19 
predictably satisfied no one, including those who thought Mueller was too 
conservative in his legal and factual conclusions.20  But the President’s 
 
 15 See William K. Rashbaum, No Charges, but Harsh Criticism for de Blasio’s Fund-
Raising, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2017, at A1 (noting that “prosecutors rarely announce the 
conclusion of such inquiries when no charges are filed”). 
 16 See Benjamin Weiser, Should Prosecutors Chastise Those They Don’t Charge?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/nyregion/bill-de-blasio-campa
ign-finance.html [https://perma.cc/V53W-D2XQ] (noting the “apparent trend” that 
prosecutors around the country “seem to have become more willing to speak publicly about 
the decision on their part not to file charges in high-profile cases”). 
 17 See Press Release, FBI Nat’l Press Office, Statement by FBI Director James B. Comey 
on the Investigation of Secretary Hillary Clinton’s Use of a Personal E-Mail System (July 5, 
2016) [hereinafter Comey Statement] (on file with Journal and author) (characterizing Hillary 
Clinton’s conduct as “extremely careless” and opining that the “security culture of the State 
Department . . . was generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found 
elsewhere in the government.”). 
 18 See Letter from Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., Manhattan District Att’y to Risa L. Sugarman, Re: 
Jan. 2016 Referral Pursuant to Election Law § 3-104(5)(B) (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Vance 
Letter] (on file with Journal and author) (noting that, while actions “do not make out a provable 
violation of the Election Law’s criminal provisions,” they appeared to be “contrary to the 
intent and spirit of the law” and constituted “an end run around the direct candidate 
contribution limits.”). 
 19 See SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (March 2019) (hereinafter 
MUELLER REPORT). 
 20 See, e.g., Bob Bauer, The Failures of the Mueller Report’s Campaign Finance Analysis, 
JUST SECURITY (May 3, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/63920/the-failures-of-the-mu
eller-report-campaign-finance-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/6TLW-8XGB] (criticizing Mueller 
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supporters also criticized the Mueller Report, which in their opinion unfairly 
and inappropriately made explicit that it did not exonerate the President, and 
because it detailed the evidence and arguments to support not only 
obstruction of justice but also possible violations of campaign finance laws.21 
Given the risks associated with such statements,22 one might ask why 
prosecutors ever would make them.  But the risks of not publicly announcing 
declinations and their rationales are daunting, too.  For example, Manhattan 
District Attorney Cyrus Vance was criticized when it emerged that he had 
declined to prosecute President Trump’s adult children for real estate 
transactions that had drawn scrutiny23 and that he had declined to prosecute 
entertainment mogul Harvey Weinstein for alleged sexual misconduct24 
without announcing those decisions publicly.  To be sure, much of the 
criticism in these cases (and in those discussed above—involving Clinton, de 
Blasio, and Trump) was based on substantive disagreement with the 
declination decisions themselves—i.e., critics believed the targets should 
have been charged.  But the fact that the prosecutor was perceived to be 
hiding the reasons for those decisions contributed to suspicions about their 
 
Report’s analysis of campaign finance law); Jack Goldsmith, The Mueller Report’s Weak 
Statutory Interpretation Analysis, LAWFARE (May 11, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog
.com/mueller-reports-weak-statutory-interpretation-analysis [https://perma.cc/4L84-JWAJ] 
(criticizing Mueller’s interpretation of obstruction of justice statutes); Josh Kovensky, In 
Deciding on Trump Obstruction, Mueller Faced ‘Uncharted’ Territory, TALKING POINTS 
MEMO (May 31, 2019), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/muckraker/trump-obstruction-why-
did-mueller-hedge [https://perma.cc/7N73-Z7PG] (quoting constitutional law professor Rick 
Pildes as criticizing Mueller for “abdicating his core responsibility” when he failed to reach a 
conclusion as to whether the President committed a crime). 
 21 See, e.g., Letter from Emmet T. Flood, Special Counsel to the Pres., to Att’y Gen. 
William P. Barr 2 (April 19, 2019), [hereinafter Flood Letter] (on file with Journal and author) 
(asserting that the “Special Counsel and his staff failed in their duty to act as prosecutors and 
only as prosecutors” by inter alia declaring in the Report that they could not exonerate the 
President, and by transmitting “a 182-page discussion of raw evidentiary material combined 
with . . . inconclusive observations on the arguable legal significance of the gathered content”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 22 See supra notes 12–14, and accompanying text. 
 23 See Vivian Wang & James C. McKinley Jr., Cuomo Orders Review of Decision Not to 
Prosecute Weinstein in 2015, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/0
3/19/nyregion/cy-vance-harvey-weinstein-cuomo.html [https://perma.cc/WFK2-A38B]. 
 24 See Jesse Eisinger et al., Ivanka and Donald Trump, Jr. Were Close to Being Charged 
with Felony Fraud, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/article/ivanka-d
onald-trump-jr-close-to-being-charged-felony-fraud [https://perma.cc/4VMM-9NUC]; Mike 
McIntire, Donald Trump Settled a Real Estate Lawsuit, and a Criminal Case Was Closed, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/06/us/politics/donald-trump-
soho-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/78HJ-W2KC]. 
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legitimacy.25  The 2019 controversy over the decision by Cook County 
State’s Attorney Kimberly Foxx to drop charges against actor Jussie Smollett 
for his false report of a hate crime highlights the dangers of a prosecutor 
providing insufficient reasons—or insufficiently persuasive ones—to justify 
the exercise of negative discretion.  In that case, the mayor and the police 
chief of Chicago immediately excoriated the prosecutor’s decision to drop 
charges, and the Cook County Circuit Court Judge appointed a special 
prosecutor to investigate the case.26 
These examples highlight the tightrope that prosecutors walk in 
deciding whether and how to announce a declination decision.  These 
examples hail from high-profile cases, but they reveal the interests that 
prosecutors are implicitly seeking to balance even in the less extraordinary 
cases handled by prosecutors around the country every day.  Yet there is no 
literature expressly articulating those interests, how they should be balanced, 
or exploring why it is consistent with the prosecutorial role for prosecutors 
ever to make public their declination decisions.  This Article attempts to fill 
that void. 
Part I begins that project by theorizing three, sometimes overlapping, 
types of interests that statements about declination can serve: signaling, 
accountability, and history-keeping.  The first category of such interests is 
described as signaling.  For example, a declination statement can signal 
closure or the need to pursue other avenues of relief to those most 
immediately affected by the declination—including targets, victims, and 
witnesses.  To the larger public, declination statements can signal 
prosecutors’ interpretation of the criminal law, and the reasons why certain 
prosecutions, even if possible, may not be wise.  Relatedly, declination 
statements can convey aspects of the prosecutorial role that may not 
otherwise be apparent, such as the reality that a critical part of the 
prosecutor’s job is to set priorities and exercise judgment about which cases 
 
 25 For example, when first asked about the declination in the Trump case, the Manhattan 
District Attorney’s Office initially said that “it could not provide information on a ‘criminal 
investigation which does not result in an arrest of prosecution.’” McIntire, supra note 24. 
Vance later agreed to be interviewed about the decision in an apparent effort to quell the 
controversy. See Eisinger, supra note 24 (quoting Vance as explaining that “[t]his started as a 
civil case . . . . It was settled as a civil case with a statement by the purchasers of luxury 
properties that they weren’t victims. And, at the end of the day, I felt if we were not going to 
charge criminally, we should leave it as a civil case in the posture in which it came to us.”). 
 26 See Julie Bosman & Sopan Deb, Jussie Smollett’s Charges Are Dropped, Angering 
Mayor and Police, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/26/ar
ts/television/jussie-smollett-charges-dropped.html [https://perma.cc/8KLU-WQN8]; Robert 
Chiarito & Julia Jacobs, Jussie Smollett Case To Be Investigated by Special Prosecutor, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/arts/television/jussie-smollett-
special-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/32F7-35MD]. 
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should be resolved outside the criminal justice system.  Absent express 
attention to declinations, the public may default to an understanding of 
prosecution that consists solely of charges and convictions.  To legislative 
bodies and prosecutors’ law enforcement partners, declinations can send 
messages about the need to fix laws and practices. 
Second, declination statements serve accountability interests by forcing 
prosecutors to articulate their reasoning and by providing a mechanism for 
comparing like cases.  So, too, declination statements can help the public 
hold prosecutors accountable for their judgments.  Particularly where there 
is concern that certain types of people receive preferential treatment based 
on their wealth, status, or relationship to the prosecutors involved (and where 
is that not a concern?), declination statements may be critical to a 
prosecutor’s perceived legitimacy.  Such statements also can help other 
institutional actors—such as legislators, governors, and law enforcement 
agencies—hold prosecutors accountable for how they exercise their 
discretion.  Conversely, through their declinations, prosecutors also can hold 
their fellow institutional actors accountable for their failure to heed prior 
messages about the need for legislative reforms, increased resources, or 
greater care in the conduct of investigations. 
Third, declinations can serve history-keeping interests when they 
provide a vehicle for relaying a narrative of past events, much as an 
indictment and trial would have if charges were filed.  When prosecutors 
exercise their discretion not to charge, there usually is no other means 
available for others to learn the information obtained by prosecutors in the 
course of their investigation.  Sometimes, there may be no other mechanism 
for the public to learn the facts at all.  In the context of complex investigations 
involving public figures or particularly salient events, that represents a 
significant loss to the historical record.  These history-keeping interests 
explain in part why many prosecutors have issued lengthy declination 
statements in recent years in on-duty shootings by police officers.  To be sure, 
these statements further significant accountability interests by enabling 
outsiders to evaluate prosecutors’ decisions not to charge as well as the 
actions of police.  Nevertheless, the value of such statements also lies in the 
extent to which they reconstruct past events, often traumatic ones, so that the 
public can understand what happened.  Even if the target of such an 
investigation were deceased, or a prosecutor and police chief were about to 
step down, such statements would serve important public interests.  Finally, 
Part I concludes with a review of the risks presented by declination 
statements.  Those risks include potential harm to the privacy and 
reputational interests of suspects, victims, and witnesses, and the 
endangerment of ongoing law enforcement operations. 
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Part II continues the project by highlighting how prosecutors operate in 
this space with little guidance from academic scholarship or professional 
policies and guidelines.  Although much academic literature in recent 
decades has focused on the power of prosecutors, little attention has been 
paid to how prosecutors should communicate with the public about their 
exercise of negative discretion.  In part, this reflects a larger hole in the 
literature—what Jeffrey Bellin has aptly described as the absence of a 
coherent normative theory of the prosecutor’s role.27  Without a prior 
understanding of what it is we expect and want from prosecutors, it is 
difficult to assess whether prosecutors are fulfilling their function well, 
including appropriately conveying declinations.  Prosecutors also do not find 
sufficient guidance in the usual sources of professional standards.  For 
example, the Justice Manual (formerly the United States Attorney’s Manual), 
which sets baseline policy for all Offices of the United States Attorneys, 
generally counsels against public declination statements, but recognizes that 
there may be circumstances in which a statement would be warranted—
without a thorough discussion of what those circumstances might be.28  The 
National District Attorney Association Standards, which provides guidance 
for state prosecutors, also does not address the subject.29  Other traditional 
sources of professional standards are similarly lacking.  Drawing upon 
information gathered through outreach to the country’s largest prosecutorial 
offices, the remainder of Part II describes how—in the absence of national 
standards—prosecutors are generally making decisions about declination 
statements on the ground.  After analyzing the patterns that emerge, this Part 
suggests a typology of prosecutors’ declination statements plotted along two 
axes: one reflecting the relative publicity of a statement and the other 
reflecting a statement’s level of detail. 
Finally, Part III builds on the prior discussion to offer a framework to 
help prosecutors navigate this difficult terrain, taking into account the extent 
to which different types of declination statements fulfill the interests and 
present the risks identified in Part I.  It suggests that prosecutors should issue 
declination statements when doing so significantly furthers one or more of 
the interests identified in Part I, where the risks posed by such statements are 
 
 27 See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CAL. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2020) 
(discussing the absence of “concrete normative principle” of what prosecutors should do). 
 28 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at §§ 1-7.100–7.400 (providing a 
presumption that “non-public, sensitive information obtained in connection with work” may 
not be disclosed outside of DOJ “other than as necessary to fulfill DOJ official duties” and 
citing unfair “damage to the reputation of a person” as one of the reasons for the policy). 
 29 See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (3d ed. 
2009). 
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minimized, and where their value cannot be realized through other available 
means given relative institutional competencies.  That framework ultimately 
counsels in most circumstances against detailed public declination statements 
that identify a particular individual, but encourages prosecutors to make more 
extensive use of other kinds of statements about declinations—such as de-
identified case summaries, aggregate reports, and narrative accounts of the 
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion—that could achieve many of the same 
interests, often more effectively, and pose fewer risks. 
I. THEORIZING PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
This Part begins the project of constructing a framework to guide 
prosecutors in issuing declination statements by conceptualizing the interests 
that such statements serve.  First, it offers an operational definition of 
declinations for the purposes of this Article.  Second, it breaks down the 
interests served by statements about declinations into three categories: 
signaling, accountability, and history-keeping.  Third, it reviews the risks 
posed by declination statements. 
A. WHAT IS A DECLINATION? 
For purposes of this Article, a declination is a decision by a prosecutor 
not to pursue criminal charges in a discrete case, largely as a matter of the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion and judgment.30  It does not include 
 
 30 This definition includes cases where the prosecutor ultimately determines that the 
evidence is insufficient on one or more elements as well as some instances of what Roger 
Fairfax characterizes as “prosecutorial nullification;” cases where the prosecutor has sufficient 
evidence to convict “but declines prosecution . . . because of the belief that the application of 
[the relevant] law to a particular defendant or in a particular context would be unwise or 
unfair.” Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Prosecutorial Nullification, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1243, 1252 (2011). 
As a point of comparison, the Department of Justice defines a declination for purposes of its 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Corporate Enforcement Policy as “a case that would 
have been prosecuted or criminally resolved except for the company’s voluntary disclosure, 
full cooperation, remediation, and payment of disgorgement, forfeiture, and/or restitution. If 
a case would have been declined in the absence of such circumstances, it is not a declination 
pursuant to this Policy.” DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-47.120 (2018); see also 
Speech by Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. Trevor McFadden (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/acting-principal-deputy-assistant-attorney-general-trevor
-n-mcfadden-speaks-anti [https://perma.cc/Z4B4-XY9A] (explaining that a declination for 
purposes of the FCPA Enforcement Policy “does not include the many cases we routinely 
decline for various reasons including insufficient evidence of corporate criminal 
misconduct”). As one scholar has observed, “[t]o use the term ‘declination’ anytime a 
company is under FCPA scrutiny (perhaps because of something as simple as a media report 
or a business competitor’s complaint), but there is no enforcement action is like saying the 
police ‘declined’ to charge a sober driver with drunk driving when passing through a field 
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instances where law enforcement agents never brought a matter to the 
attention of prosecutors.31  A declination could occur before any charges are 
filed, or in some circumstances after charges have been filed when the 
prosecutor subsequently decides to withdraw them.32  Declination does not 
occur in cases where prosecutors pursue lesser charges than the harshest ones 
supported by the facts,33 offer non-prosecution or deferred prosecution 
agreements,34 or agree to a diversionary program in lieu of the more 
traditional criminal justice process.  Although there is a good argument for 
including these other kinds of dispositions in that they raise many of the same 
issues as outright declinations, they also are sufficiently distinct as a category 
to leave out of the current project.  Among other reasons, these other 
dispositions are at least slightly more visible than declinations because they 
often result in a court filing or are otherwise made public, often are negotiated 
with defense counsel, and typically involve prosecutors maintaining leverage 
over a defendant as a condition of the disposition. 
 
sobriety checkpoint.” Mike Koehler, DOJ Defines “Declination” in Its FCPA Corporate 
Enforcement Policy, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fcpaprofessor.com/doj-defines-
declination-fcpa-corporate-enforcement-policy/ [https://perma.cc/68PC-WKL8]. 
 31 See, e.g., Jeffrey Bellin, The Power of Prosecutors, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 171, 191–92 
(2019) (discussing power of police relative to prosecutors, including by refusing to investigate 
or bring case to prosecutor); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal 
Process: Low-Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 589 
(1960). 
 32 See, e.g., Cook County State’s Att’y, Statement on Dismissal of Charges for Jussie 
Smollett (Mar. 26, 2019); Recommendation for Dismissal, People v. Dominique Strauss-
Kahn, No. 02526/2011, 2011 WL 3659989 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 22, 2011) (recommendation 
for Dismissal filed by New York Country District Attorney Cyrus Vance, explaining motion 
to dismiss sexual assault charges after indictment) [hereinafter Strauss-Kahn Dismissal]. 
 33 See Luna, supra note 6, at 796 (noting that when a prosecutor plea-bargains, “the 
prosecutor is refusing to apply the most serious crime and the toughest punishment otherwise 
applicable to a given defendant[,]” a species of “prosecutorial decriminalization”). 
 34 As Cindy R. Alexander & Yoon-Ho Alex Lee have explained succinctly in the context 
of corporate resolutions, an “NPA is an agreement between the prosecutor and the company, 
without any direct judicial supervision, in which the prosecutor agrees not to prosecute in 
return for cooperation and other concessions. In some instances, an agreement between the 
prosecutor and the company may take the form of a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). 
A DPA is filed with a court; the prosecutor offers to defer any prosecution until a certain date 
and to drop the case if the company fulfills some obligations by that date . . . . [N]either the 
NPA nor the DPA entails the corporate defendant pleading guilty . . . .” Cindy R. Alexander 
& Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Non-Prosecution of Corporations: Toward A Model of Cooperation 
and Leniency, 96 N.C. L. REV. 859, 862 (2018). 
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Also excluded from this definition are ex ante decisions about entire 
categories of cases that the prosecutor will not pursue35 or the factors that 
will influence the decision whether to pursue charges in an individual case.36  
To be sure, these are related aspects of the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Moreover, the decision to decline prosecution in a discrete case 
may be determined in whole or in part by reference to such ex ante policies.  
 
 35 See, e.g., District Attorney Vance to End the Prosecution of Marijuana Possession and 
Smoking Cases, N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (May 15, 2018), https://www.manhatta
nda.org/district-attorney-vance-to-end-the-prosecution-of-marijuana-possession-and-smokin
g-cases/ [https://perma.cc/8ZDF-5L48]; Stephanie Clifford & Joseph Goldstein, Brooklyn 
Prosecutor Limits When He’ll Target Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2014), https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/07/09/nyregion/brooklyn-district-attorney-to-stop-prosecuting-low-level-
marijuana-cases.html [https://perma.cc/XK7S-G4XF] (describing announcement by then 
Brooklyn District Attorney Kenneth P. Thompson that his office would no longer prosecute 
most low-level marijuana cases); Jim Salter, St. Louis to End Prosecution of Low-Level 
Marijuana Crimes, SEATTLE TIMES (June 13, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-wo
rld/st-louis-to-end-prosecution-of-low-level-marijuana-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/2A6J-GTY
P] (describing decision by St. Louis Circuit Attorney Kim Gardner not to pursue cases 
involving possession of small amounts of marijuana, and decision by Philadelphia District 
Attorney Larry Krasner that his office would no longer prosecute such cases); see also 
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen. to All U.S. Att’ys (Aug. 29, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/V
6FR-FVGX] (setting forth DOJ policy under President Barack Obama of generally not 
pursuing marijuana possession and sale offenses in states where such conduct was legalized); 
Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen. to Selected U.S. Att’ys (Oct. 19, 
2009), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-united-state-attorneys-invest
igations-and-prosecutions-states [https://perma.cc/MF4Z-8NZ3]. 
 36 The Department of Justice has issued such policies for a variety of white-collar 
enforcement areas. See, e.g., DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-47.120 (2018) 
(FCPA Division policy); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORPORATE LENIENCY POLICY (Aug. 10, 
1993) (Antitrust Division policy). Such policies are less common for other types of crime and 
at the state level. As Darryl Brown has written, 
The Department of Justice maintains sets of prosecution policy statements—specific to 
substantive areas such as health care fraud, intellectual property crime, and corporate crime 
generally—that identify appropriate grounds for charging, declination, or sentencing leniency. 
The Department’s most general guidelines for criminal prosecution, found in the U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual, list only traditional criteria such as deterrent effects, offender culpability, and the 
seriousness of the offense, along with practical concerns such as availability of admissible proof, 
cooperating witnesses, and prosecution by other jurisdictions. That document, in other words, 
reads as it should according to traditional criminal law theory . . . . The common thread of 
examples so far is that . . . they involve white-collar crime and federal practice. One is hard-
pressed to find comparable examples in the prosecution policies that guide enforcement of 
traditional street-crime laws. State prosecutors tend to have few written charging policies . . . . 
Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1386, 1392–
93 (2002). In some states, the legislature has enacted statutes codifying the factors that 
prosecutors should consider in deciding whether to decline a case. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9.94A.411(1) (2017) (listing reasons why a prosecuting attorney “may decline to prosecute, 
even though technically sufficient evidence to prosecute exists.”). 
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However, while there is considerable overlap between the issues raised by 
such policies and the ex post decision to charge a particular individual in a 
particular case, these two different types of prosecutorial decisions are 
different enough to warrant separate analysis.  The intent of this limitation is 
to focus on those cases where the decision not to charge was not a categorical 
one; such decisions are the most revealing of prosecutors’ thought processes 
and priorities because they are preceded by an assessment of the evidence 
against the available charges and defenses, the norms of practice, or the 
equities of a particular situation.  Further, the ex ante policies excluded from 
this definition of declinations herein have received some attention in 
scholarly literature and in court decisions,37 whereas the declinations that are 
the focus of this Article largely have been overlooked. 
B. THE INTERESTS SERVED BY DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
This section elaborates on the three categories of interests that 
declination statements can serve: signaling, accountability, and history-
keeping.  These interests sometimes overlap, and a single declination 
statement may serve all three.  Nevertheless, there is value in delineating and 
discussing them separately, to later help build and apply a framework guiding 
prosecutors’ declination statements. 
1. Signaling 
First, declination statements can advance signaling interests, 
communicating important messages to various audiences.  There are at least 
five forms of signaling: (1) closure to those most immediately affected by a 
declination decision; (2) respect to prosecutors’ fellow institutional actors 
such as law enforcement agencies and legislators; (3) nudges about the need 
for reforms; (4) educational signals to the public about the criminal law; and 
(5) signals about the prosecutorial role. 
 
 37 Analysis of such ex ante policies has generally occurred in the context of agency non-
enforcement rather than prosecutorial non-enforcement. See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 
F.3d 134, 166–69 (2016) (discussing DAPA’s nonenforcement policy); see also Robert J. 
Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of 
Immigration Laws, the Dream Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781 (2013); 
Robert A. Mikos, A Critical Appraisal of the Department of Justice’s New Approach to 
Medical Marijuana, 22 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 633 (2011); Aaron L. Nielson, How Agencies 
Choose Whether to Enforce the Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1517 (2018); Zachary S. Price, 
Reliance on Nonenforcement, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 937 (2017). But see Feinberg v. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 808 F.3d 813, 814–16 (10th Cir. 2015) (discussing the 
DOJ’s policy of declining certain marijuana prosecutions); Zachary S. Price, Enforcement 
Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 757–59 (2014) (discussing the DOJ’s 
policy of declining certain marijuana prosecutions). 
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a. Closure 
To begin, declination statements convey closure to the two most 
important parties in potential criminal prosecutions: victims and potential 
targets of prosecution.  Victims benefit from knowing that a decision has 
been made, even if they disagree with it.  Rather than remaining in limbo, 
pending the resolution of a possible criminal case, they can move on with 
their lives.  That closure alone is valuable, but it also can liberate victims to 
pursue other avenues of redress that may be available such as civil suits,38 
legislative or executive oversight hearings, or journalistic exposure.39  
During the pendency of a criminal investigation, witnesses, including 
victims, often are discouraged from pursuing such remedies out of concern 
that they will compromise the criminal case.40  Once the prosecutor has 
declined to bring charges, those concerns dissipate. 
 
 38 In the vast majority of United States jurisdictions, victims and interested members of 
the public cannot pursue criminal charges on their own; prosecutors, in effect, hold a 
monopoly over the invocation of criminal process. A few states still allow private parties to 
initiate a case, but such cases rarely proceed if prosecutors are unwilling to pursue them. See 
Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Enforcement Redundancy: Oversight of Decisions Not to 
Prosecute, 103 MINN. L. REV. 843, 867–70 (2018) (tracing the Unites States’ evolution from 
a system of private law enforcement, with cases brought by victims or their kin, to a system 
of public prosecution); Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law 
Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 718–19 (2016) (tracing the Unites States’ 
evolution from a system of private law enforcement, with cases brought by victims or their 
kin, to a system of public prosecution). However, crime victims may be able to pursue civil 
remedies against the perpetrators of crime and third parties. See, e.g., Tom Lininger, Is It 
Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1568–79 (2008) (discussing rise in civil suits for 
sexual assault and the advantages of such suits over criminal prosecutions). 
 39 For example, revelations of Alexander Acosta’s decision when he served as a United 
States Attorney in Florida not to pursue charges against Jeffrey Epstein for sexual assault 
prompted Congress to demand his testimony and briefings from the Department of Justice 
about the case. See Kimberly Kindy et al., Acosta Defends Wealthy Sex Offender Jeffrey 
Epstein’s Plea Deal, Says Epstein Would’ve Had No Jail Time if his Office Had Not 
Intervened, WASH. POST (July 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/labor-sec
retary-to-hold-news-conference-to-defend-himself-amid-outcry-over-handling-of-epstein-ple
a-deal/2019/07/10/b136b9a4-a321-11e9-b7b4-95e30869bd15_story.html [https://perma.cc/4
ZH2-T7FQ]. The full scope of Epstein’s criminal conduct was the subject of extensive 
investigative reporting by the Miami Herald. See Julie K. Brown, How a Future Trump 
Cabinet Member Gave A Serial Sex Abuser the Deal of a Lifetime, MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/article220097825.html [https://perma.cc/V
G48-GQAJ] (part of series of articles by Julie Brown collectively entitled “Perversion of 
Justice” published by the Miami Herald on Nov. 28, 2018 about the Epstein case). 
 40 See, e.g., Clifford v. Trump, No. 18-cv-02217, 2018 WL 3435419, at *2 (C.D.C.A. Apr. 
27, 2018) (citing United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 n. 27 (1970)) (describing practice of 
staying civil cases during pendency of parallel criminal case); Aviva Life & Annuity Co. v. 
Davis, No. 12-cv-00603, 2014 WL 12366406, at *11 (S.D. Iowa July 29, 2014) (granting 
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Similarly, a declination statement offers closure to targets who were 
aware they were under investigation.  If someone had been publicly identified 
during the course of the investigation, a statement also offers that target the 
opportunity to resuscitate their reputation, or at least attempt to do so.  For 
that reason, it is not uncommon for targets to seek a declination statement.41  
Their reputations may never be fully restored, but the stigma may be lessened 
by the announcement of the declination.  There may also be very practical 
negative consequences that flow from the investigation which can be 
ameliorated only when a declination is made public.  For example, a 
politician will face an uphill battle running for reelection while under 
investigation.42  Private actors similarly may find that their employment 
prospects will not recover until a declination is announced.  Corporate 
entities may find that their stock price suffers, that they are unable to contract 
with government agencies, or that they are at a disadvantage in attracting 
talent or business partners until the cloud of an investigation has been lifted.43 
 
Manhattan District Attorney’s motion to stay parallel civil proceedings brought by victim); 
Capak v. Epps, No. 18-cv-4325, 2018 WL 6726553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2018) 
(describing practice of staying civil cases during pendency of parallel criminal case). 
 41 For example, the attorney for New York Governor Andrew Cuomo praised the 
announcement by then-United States Attorney Preet Bharara that his office would not be filing 
charges against the Governor for interference with the Moreland Commission established to 
investigate corruption, stating, “We were always confident there was no illegality here, and 
we appreciate the U.S. attorney clarifying this for the public record.” Weiser, supra note 16. 
Another defense attorney opined that, in cases that had received extensive publicity, “it is not 
only appropriate, it is absolutely necessary [that the target] be publicly cleared” when 
prosecutors decline to bring charges. Id. 
 42 Then-Acting United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon Kim, 
acknowledged this reality when he publicly announced his office’s decision not to charge 
Mayor Bill de Blasio so as to not “unduly influence the upcoming campaign and mayoral 
election.” Acting U.S. Attorney Joon H. Kim Statement On The Investigation Into City Hall 
Fundraising, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/ac
ting-us-attorney-joon-h-kim-statement-investigation-city-hall-fundraising [https://perma.cc/3
GUY-PJBZ]. The Department of Justice’s so-called “60 day” rule—a policy against 
announcing charging decisions within 60 days of an election that could influence that 
election—also reflects this dynamic. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., 
A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 17 (June 2018). 
 43 See Pamela H. Bucy, Trends in Corporate Criminal Prosecutions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1287, 1288–89 (2007) (listing examples of stock declines due to investigation announcements 
and discussing other corporate ramifications); U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 
Seeking Clarity in How and When the Department of Justice Declines to Prosecute 5 (Oct. 
2012) (noting the “chilling effect of pending investigations” on a “company’s financial 
reporting, ability to secure credit, undertake capital initiatives, retain and recruit talent and a 
host of other everyday elements necessary to business success”). 
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b. Respect 
Through declination statements, prosecutors also can signal respect to 
the other institutional actors that are their partners in the complex undertaking 
of law enforcement and governance.  For example, the police and other 
investigative agencies that routinely refer cases to prosecutors often will be 
interested in whether the prosecutor proceeded with the filing of charges.44  
Absent a declination statement, those agencies may not otherwise find out 
that a prosecutor has declined to pursue the case.  Thus, providing that 
information helps preserve those interagency relationships, upon which 
prosecutors depend.45  Similarly, when the legislature46 or another agency 
refers a case to the prosecutor, informing that entity of the prosecutor’s 
decision may be critical to institutional comity.47 
c. Nudges 
When prosecutors offer the reasons for the declination—especially 
when those reasons are grounded in insufficient evidence, or problems with 
law enforcement agencies’ conduct of the investigation, such as an unlawful 
search—the statements also can serve a pedagogical function and signal the 
need for corrective action by those agencies.48  As discussed further below 
 
 44 See, e.g., Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their 
Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 758–67 (2003) (discussing dynamic between federal 
prosecutors and agents). 
 45 Id.; see also Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 885, 899 (2018) (noting the “close and symbiotic relationship” between prosecutors and 
the police who initiate “both the criminal process and the prosecutor’s involvement” in the 
majority of cases). 
 46 Recent examples include Congress’s referral of then-IRS Commissioner Lois Lerner to 
the Department of Justice for possible prosecution for civil rights violations and other crimes 
arising from the IRS’s processing of tax-exempt applications in a manner that 
disproportionality impacted certain groups based on political affiliation. See Letter from Peter 
J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t. of Justice, to Hon. Bob Goodlatte & Hon. John 
Conyers, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 47 See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 484 (noting that much of prosecutors’ influence stems 
from “their air of authority and their ongoing relationships” with other institutional actors, 
including legislators); see also Richman, supra note 44, at 755–94 (2003) (on prosecutors’ 
soft influence). 
 48 See also VENTURA CTY. DIST. ATT’Y OFF., LEGAL POLICIES MANUAL 158 (Rev. Nov. 2, 
2018) (on file with author). See generally Adam Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Dismissals as 
Teachable Moments (and Databases) for the Police, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1525 (2018) 
(discussing ways in which prosecutors could use case dismissals as “teachable moments” for 
police); Eric L. Nelson, The Relationship Between Individual Police Officers Work Habits and 
the Stated Reasons Prosecutors Reject Their Domestic Violence Investigations, SAGE OPEN, 
October–December 2013, at 8 (finding that prosecutorial feedback helped police improve their 
evidence collection practices in domestic abuse cases). 
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in Section I(B)(2)(d), prosecutors can hold their law enforcement partners 
accountable by declining to prosecute cases on account of police misconduct 
or ineptitude.  However, declination statements also provide an opportunity 
to educate police and other law enforcement partners, especially when they 
explain how investigatory failures led to the prosecutor’s decision. 
Prosecutors also can signal to legislators the limitations of existing laws 
through their declination statements.  For example, a prosecutor might cite 
the narrow definition of bribery or the specific requirements of campaign 
finance laws in explaining a decision not to file charges in cases involving 
alleged public corruption.49  Or, as frequently occurs in cases involving 
alleged sexual assault, the prosecutor may cite a legal rationale, such as the 
expiration of the statute of limitations, as a primary reason for declining to 
file charges.50  Such statements provide the legislature with useful 
 
 49 For example, Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s letter explaining his decision not to 
charge New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio recommended several changes to the state’s 
election laws to cover the conduct uncovered in his investigation. See Vance Letter, supra 
note 18, at 9–10; see also Chelsea Brentzel, “Immoral but not Criminal” – Lead Prosecutor 
in Bentley Probe Explains Decision Not to Bring Charges, WHNT NEWS 19 (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://whnt.com/news/politics/immoral-but-not-criminal-lead-prosecutor-in-bentley-probe-
explains-decision-not-to-bring-charges/ [https://perma.cc/PU3F-GEAJ] (Alabama special 
prosecutor on decision not to charge former Governor relating to his use of state funds in 
connection with relationship with top aide, offering that “lawmakers need to know there are 
holes in the state law that hindered the investigation. ‘Unfortunately our hands were tied, and 
we could not go forward because of laws, or lack of laws.’”); Brendan Krisel, Cabbie Who 
Forced Cyclist Into Path Of Truck Not Charged: Police, PATCH (Sept. 6, 2018), https://patch
.com/new-york/upper-west-side-nyc/da-declined-prosecute-cabbie-who-caused-fatal-uws-cr
ash-cops [https://perma.cc/WEA5-ZU8E] (announcement by Manhattan DA Cyrus Vance 
regarding decision not to prosecute cab driver for cyclist’s death included statement that his 
office had “determined that New York law does not provide criminal liability for drivers 
whose illegal standing contributes to a fatality in instances where no contact is made between 
the illegally standing vehicle and the victim. We would strongly support legislation to address 
this gap in the law”); Beth LeBlanc, Prosecutor: No Charges for Lawmaker Who Brought Gun 
to Airport, DETROIT NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/local/
michigan/2018/08/06/michigan-lawmaker-no-criminal-charges-bringing-gun-airport/913110
002/ [https://perma.cc/HCM7-J63L] (statement by Emmet County, Michigan Prosecutor that 
state legislator could not be charged due to state law’s incorporation by reference of a deleted 
provision of federal law, noting that “[o]ur legislature needs to address this by adding a 
definition within our own statutes”). 
 50 See, e.g., LA Prosecutors Decline Sex Abuse Charges Against CBS CEO Les Moonves, 
WGN9 (Aug. 1, 2018), https://wgntv.com/news/la-prosecutors-decline-sex-abuse-charges-a
gainst-cbs-ceo-les-moonves/ [https://perma.cc/W597-N5GG]; Sarah Mervosh, Prosecutors 
Decline to Charge Kevin Spacey, Steven Seagal Due to Statute of Limitations, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/us/charges-kevin-spacey-seagal-ander
son.html [https://perma.cc/A32C-BE33]; Tilly Pearce, American Horror Story’s Dylan 
McDermott Avoid Prosecution in Sexual Assault Case, METRO (Sept. 8, 2018), https://metro.
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information for deciding whether legislative reform is needed.  In some 
instances, prosecutors go one step further and suggest particular legislative 
fixes to address the legal impediments they have identified.51 
In addition, declination statements offer the opportunity for prosecutors 
to frame future actions that can be taken by other entities.  For example, a 
statement that primarily cites the high burden of proof in criminal cases may 
signal to civil enforcement agencies and private actors that a civil suit or other 
action would be worthwhile.52  Conversely, a statement citing problems with 
the credibility of key witnesses may send the opposite signal.53  Where a 
legislative panel or executive actor has indicated an interest in a particular 
matter, a declination statement also can forestall or shape the focus of those 
entities’ investigations or oversight hearings.54 
 
co.uk/2018/09/08/american-horror-storys-dylan-mcdermott-avoids-prosecution-in-sexual-ass
ault-case-7925942/ [https://perma.cc/XKD7-TVM9]; Robert Tait, LA Prosecutors Decline to 
Press Charges Against Bill Cosby, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/n
ews/worldnews/northamerica/usa/12087875/LA-prosecutors-decline-to-press-charges-agains
t-Bill-Cosby.html [https://perma.cc/7WJ7-GVT5]. 
 51 In one recent case, the District Attorney for Nassau County who was assigned the 
investigation of former New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman for sexual abuse cited 
the narrow definitions of existing sexual assault provisions and their statutes of limitations as 
reasons for her declination. She also drafted and transmitted to the state legislature a proposed 
bill to enact the needed reforms she had identified. See Alan Feuer, Schneiderman Will Not 
Face Criminal Charges in Abuse Complaints, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytim
es.com/2018/11/08/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-abuse-charges.html [https://perma.cc/3T9X-
VTRZ]; see also Vance Letter, supra note 18. 
 52 A number of the statements issued by the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office in 
recent years in police shooting cases explicitly note this distinction but do not opine on 
whether the lower standard of proof could be met. See, e.g., COOK CTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, POLICE 
INVOLVED DEATH DECISION MEMO 3 (Jan. 19, 2018). Similarly, Manhattan District Attorney 
Vance’s letter on Mayor de Blasio emphasized that the District Attorney’s determination was 
limited to whether criminal charges could be brought, given the proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. He explicitly stated, “[t]his determination does not foreclose the BOE or others 
from pursuing any civil or regulatory actions that they might determine might be warranted 
by these facts.” See Vance Letter, supra note 18; see also MISSOURI ETHICS COMM’N, LETTER 
TO ERIC GREITENS RE: MEC NO. 18-0014-I (Aug. 17, 2018) (explaining that charges against 
Governor Greitens were declined in spite of the fact that the Missouri Ethics Commission 
found “reasonable grounds to believe that a violation of criminal law had occurred”). 
 53 Statements about the credibility of witnesses may be particularly important to private 
enforcement actors, such as corporate boards and professional associations, which have the 
authority to discipline an individual for misconduct not rising to the level of criminality, or 
not provable beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 54 On Congress’s authority to investigate and demand information from the Department 
of Justice regarding both open and closed investigations, see MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY (1995) [hereinafter INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT]; 
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d. Public Pedagogy about the Criminal Law 
Declination statements also provide an opportunity for prosecutors to 
educate the public about the content of criminal law.  Through more 
traditional means like charging instruments and trials, prosecutors routinely 
walk the public, grand juries, and juries through the findings necessary to 
convict a person of a crime.  As Daniel Richman has observed, prosecutors 
do not “silently preside over [the] gates” to the courthouse; “the essence of 
their job is to explain how the law has been violated.”55  This function is also 
served when a prosecutor explains in a declination statement that the 
evidence does not establish a necessary element of a crime, or that it supports 
an affirmative defense.  Through these statements, the public learns about 
these aspects of the law that may be unfamiliar—and likely in language than 
is more accessible than that available in court opinions, charging documents, 
and even statutes themselves.56  For example, many of the declination 
statements issued in police shooting cases include a discussion of the law of 
self-defense and the government’s burden in disproving such a claim.57  The 
same is true of the more procedural aspects of the law, like the burden of 
 
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., LEGAL AND HISTORICAL SUBSTANTIALITY OF 
FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL CIVILETTI’S VIEWS AS TO THE SCOPE AND REACH OF CONGRESS’S 
AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT OVERSIGHT IN THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, reprinted in EPA’S 
CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM: HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 
AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 12–23 (1993). 
For an example of a declination decision conveyed to Congress following a referral—and 
likely aware of the strong possibility that Congressional oversight hearings would follow, 
scrutinizing that decision—see Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t. of 
Justice, to Hon. Bob Goodlatte & Hon. John Conyers, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives 
Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 23, 2015). 
 55 See Richman, supra note 14. 
 56 As Richard Zabel, the former Deputy United States Attorney in the Southern District of 
New York, once said of the value of prosecutors’ public statements, “The purpose of a quote 
is to be quoted and draw attention to the case . . . . Laypeople can’t read a complaint.” Jacob 
Gershman, Federal Judge Chides Bharara for ‘Tabloid’ Press Operation, WALL STREET J. L. 
BLOG (Oct. 16, 2013), https://blogs.wsj.com/law/2013/10/16/federal-judge-chides-bharara-fo
r-tabloid-press-operation/ [https://perma.cc/HYV5-R5Y3]. 
 57 See, e.g., JACKIE LACEY, LOS ANGELES CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING 
OF JUAN BARILLAS (Jan. 8, 2019); see also Federal Officials Close Review of Fatal Shooting 
of Kionte Spencer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdva/pr/federal-officials-close-review-fatal-shooting-kionte-spencer [https://perma.cc/G8R
Y-E7MH] (relatively long statement that discusses the facts and applicable legal standard for 
the civil rights laws at issue, involving police shooting of man with BB gun). As one attorney 
said in reaction to a declination statement issued by then-United States Attorney Preet Bharara 
explaining the decision not to bring federal civil rights charges against an officer for a fatal 
shooting, “it just spoke in terms of how high the bar is for a federal civil rights indictment,” 
which “was helpful in clarifying the guidelines for prosecuting such cases.” Weiser, supra 
note 16. 
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proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the statute of limitations, which 
prosecutors often cite in their rationale for declining to bring charges in 
sexual assault cases.58  The more specific the prosecutor’s explanation is for 
the declination, the greater the pedagogical value of the statement.59 
Declination statements also convey something that is not available in 
statutes or judicial opinions—namely, the prosecutors’ interpretation of the 
law, what might be called the “common law” of prosecutorial decision-
making.60  This is subtly distinct from the foregoing point, but it is important.  
As Eric Luna observed, prosecutors do not merely enforce the law: they 
“legislate criminal law, setting the penal code’s effective scope” through 
their discretionary enforcement decisions.61  Of course, this interpretive 
power is exercised unofficially—in the sense that, unlike administrative 
agencies, prosecutors do not have formal authority to interpret the statutes 
they enforce.62  But it is no less real.63 
 
 58 See supra note 50. 
 59 See Nirej Sekhon, The Pedagogical Prosecutor, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 6 (2014) 
(noting that prosecutors’ public statements about declinations can promote “more intensive 
public engagement with criminal-justice policy”); id. at 44–45 (arguing that declination 
decisions in self-defense cases in particular should include case narratives providing 
information that “would usefully inform public discussion” about self-defense laws). 
 60 As Daniel Richman has noted, “[b]road notions of ‘prosecutorial discretion’ over what 
charges they need to bring and against whom allow American prosecutors to effectively 
‘define’ criminal law to be well short of that ostensibly set by statute” but “[c]onversely, 
through the cases they take and the way they frame the facts, American prosecutors regularly 
push the law beyond its initially assumed limits.” Richman, supra note 14, at 45–46. 
 61 Carissa Byrne Hessick, The Myth of Common Law Crimes, 105 VIRGINIA L. REV. 965, 
992 (2019) (noting that prosecutors “largely determine the scope of modern criminal law”); 
see also Erik Luna, Prosecutor King, 1 STAN. J. CRIM. L. & POL’Y 48, 57 (2014). 
 62 See Max Minzner, Should Agencies Enforce?, 99 MINN. L. REV. 2113, 2115–16 (2015). 
Some scholars have argued that prosecutors should have such authority. See, e.g., Dan M. 
Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 488–92 
(1996). 
 63 For example, when James Comey announced that, in his opinion, no reasonable 
prosecutor would charge Hillary Clinton for violating the statutes regarding the handling of 
classified information, he was invoking this common law. See Text of F.B.I. Director’s 
Remarks on Investigation into Hillary Clinton’s Email Use, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/transcript-james-comey-hillary-clinton-emails.html [https
://perma.cc/XBL6-HJ2Z] (“In looking back at our investigations into mishandling or removal 
of classified information, we cannot find a case that would support brining criminal charges 
on these facts.”). So too, when then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New 
York, Michael Garcia, announced that former New York Governor, Eliot Spitzer, would not 
be charged for various federal crimes relating to his hiring of prostitutes, he invoked that 
common law. See Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum, No Federal Prostitution Charges 
for Spitzer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/07/nyregion/07sp
itzer.html [https://perma.cc/M94D-KTE6] (quoting Michael Garcia’s statement that Spitzer 
 
498 ROTH [Vol. 110 
Criminal justice insiders—including defense attorneys who have been 
around the block many times in cases involving the same potential charges 
or defenses—often have access to this prosecutorial “common law.”  For 
example, based upon their own experience, they may know of prior instances 
when a prosecutor did not think charges were worth pursuing and can draw 
upon that knowledge in advising clients and negotiating with prosecutors, 
including persuading them not to press charges.64  But outsiders—including 
the public at large, especially those who cannot afford to have high-priced 
lawyers advise them—will not have access to that same common law.  Even 
lawyers who are repeat players may only be able to draw upon their own 
experience if they lack the time, money, or connections necessary to pool 
information with other lawyers.  Opacity thus puts at a comparative 
disadvantage those without access to system insiders, who may then see 
worse outcomes should they get ensnared in the criminal justice system 
because their lawyers lack access to these common law “precedents.”  They 
also are at a relative disadvantage before they ever come into contact with 
the criminal justice system, when they are deciding how to conduct 
themselves in light of a criminal statute, because they lack information about 
how prosecutors actually apply the law (usually more narrowly than the law 
is written).65  Making a corpus of declination statements publicly available 
thus serves a democratizing function,66 leveling the playing field between 
actors and competitors (including in the corporate sphere) with differing 
resources.  It also would provide the public with vital information about the 
meaning of the criminal law in practice—a good in and of itself if we value 
an informed citizenry.  It also would equip the public to more effectively 
 
would not be charged, in part, on account of longstanding policies of the Department of Justice 
and of the Southern District of New York). Although Garcia’s statement did not explicitly 
discuss the content of those policies, they are policies reflected in the Justice Manual against 
charging individuals who are customers of prostitutes, as opposed to those engaged in the 
business of promoting prostitution. Id. 
 64 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2131–34 (1998) (describing process by which defense counsel appeal to 
prosecutors’ sense of “horizontal equity among similarly-situated persons”). 
 65 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 226 
(2007) (discussing how prosecutors “greatly limit the effective scope of criminal law”). 
 66 In the realm of corporate criminal enforcement, such a corpus exists in the form of “the 
record of disclosed, detailed settlements that tell a story about who got what for doing what.” 
Samuel L. Buell, Why Do Prosecutors Say Anything? The Case of Corporate Crime, 96 N. C. 
L. REV. 823, 835 (2018). Some scholars like Brandon Garett have painstakingly assembled 
these resources. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Corporate Prosecution Registry, DUKE 
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW & UNIV. OF VA. SCH. OF LAW, http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/corporate-
prosecution-registry/index.html [https://perma.cc/3GJD-B43E]. 
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demand changes in how the criminal law is interpreted if the status quo is 
deemed unsatisfactory.67 
e. Public Pedagogy about the Prosecutorial Role 
Finally, the public announcement of declinations surfaces the centrality 
of negative discretion in the prosecutorial function.  In a world of expansive 
criminal law and limited resources, not every prosecutable case can or should 
be charged.68  Where prosecutors deem the evidence of a crime sufficient to 
convict, they often file charges and seek convictions.  But, not always.  
Sometimes the exercise of negative discretion is the product of categorical 
choices made ex ante based on policy priorities, but sometimes it reflects a 
judgment that an individual prosecution is not worth pursuing because it is 
not ultimately in the interest of justice.69  For example, a case may be 
adequately prosecuted in another jurisdiction.70  The impact on victims may 
be too much to put them through.71  Or the prosecutor may decide that the 
 
 67 See generally STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 31–34 (2012) 
(exploring differences in access to information between criminal justice insiders and 
outsiders); Hessick, supra note 61, at 996 (noting that because “the public rarely learns about 
the cases a prosecutor does not litigate,” prosecutors’ decisions about “the scope of modern 
criminal law . . . are not visible to the public”). 
 68 For a classic treatment of criminal law’s breadth and depth, at both the state and federal 
law, see Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper 
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (1995). See also William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001). As Stephen 
Smith has written, “[f]rom across the political spectrum, there is wide consensus that 
overcriminalization is a serious problem.” Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming 
Overcriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 537, 537 (2012). 
 69 For example, the state of Washington authorizes prosecutors to decline prosecution in 
a variety of circumstances even where sufficient evidence exists to convict, including when 
“prosecution would serve no public purpose.” WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.077 (2011). 
 70 See, e.g., Doug Schneider, Wisconsin DA Says He Has No Plans to File Charges 
Related to Jayme Closs’ 88-Day Captivity, USA TODAY (Jan. 26, 2019), https://www.usatoda
y.com/story/news/nation/2019/01/26/jayme-closs-case-da-has-no-plan-file-more-charges/26
92969002/ [https://perma.cc/KF9N-GVDF] (describing statement by Douglas County, 
Wisconsin District Attorney that he would not file additional charges against suspect already 
charged in neighboring county, citing “consideration of multiple factors, including the 
existence of other charges and victim-related concerns.”); see also § 13.40.077(d)–(e) 
(authorizing prosecutors to decline prosecution where individual is already confined on 
another charge, or another charge is pending in another jurisdiction, and conviction on the 
additional charge would not yield significant additional prison time or serve any significant 
purpose such as deterrence). 
 71 See, e.g., § 13.40.077(1)(i) (victim request may provide reason to decline prosecution, 
if freely made); Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30, at 1258 (noting that “[a] prosecutor might decline 
a meritorious criminal case because the potential harm to the victim resulting from the 
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defendant has suffered enough through other means, or is deserving of 
leniency.72 
Unless prosecutors acknowledge declinations of all types, the public is 
unlikely to appreciate the significance of declinations to the prosecutorial 
role and instead will view prosecutors strictly in terms of charges and 
convictions.73  Prosecutors who talk about declinations educate the public 
about this crucial, often overlooked, aspect of their role.  Moreover, by 
initiating conversations about declinations, prosecutors communicate 
something about the importance that they attach to this part of their mission.  
Thus, communications about declinations, particularly those where 
discretion is at its zenith because the evidence is sufficient to charge, serve a 
pedagogical purpose.  They also help ensure that prosecutors are held 
accountable for how they conceive of and execute this critical component of 
their authority. 
2. Accountability 
Declination statements promote the accountability of prosecutors and 
other institutional actors in a variety of ways.  They help prosecutors hold 
themselves accountable for their own precommitments,74 make it possible for 
 
prosecution might outweigh the benefit to the victim and society.”); Melinda Henneberger, 
Connecticut Prosecutor Won’t File Charges Against Woody Allen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 
1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/09/25/nyregion/connecticut-prosecutor-won-t-file-cha
rges-against-woody-allen.html [https://perma.cc/R9KC-MH36] (suggesting that proceeding 
with prosecution of Woody Allen would not be in the victim’s best interest); Schneider, supra 
note 70 (discussing impact on victim as additional reason not to pursue prosecution). 
 72 See, e.g., Cook County State’s Att’y, supra note 32 (stating that dismissal of charges 
was “a just disposition and appropriate resolution to this case,” citing “Mr. Smollett’s 
volunteer service in the community and agreement to forfeit his bond” and suggesting that the 
outcome would be the same for any other defendant in similar circumstances); see also 
Bowers, supra note 1, at 1682 (positing that prosecution may not be warranted against a 
mother who negligently kills her own child on the grounds that she “has already suffered 
substantially—if not enough—from the mere fact of her child’s death”). 
 73 See, e.g., Jason Kreag, Prosecutorial Analytics, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 771, 776 (2017) 
(noting that “prosecutors and those who observe them still often rely on crude measures of 
their performance, i.e., crime rates and conviction rates . . . [which] overlook important 
questions about how prosecutors exercise their discretion”). 
 74 As Richard Markovitz has explained, “[w]hen precommitment theorists state that ‘an 
individual has made a precommitment,’ they mean that he has chosen in the present to do 
something (or not to do something) in order to alter the way in which he will respond to 
particular situations in the future.” Richard S. Markovitz, Precommitment Analysis and 
Societal Moral Identity, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1877, 1878 (2003); see also Jon Elster, Don’t Burn 
Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities of Precommitment, 
81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1752–54 (2003) (describing the idea of precommitment as “self-
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external actors to hold prosecutors accountable, and also provide a means by 
which prosecutors can hold accountable other institutional actors. 
a. Internal Accountability to Precommitments 
First, the process of constructing declination statements, even if only for 
the prosecutor’s own use initially, can help prosecutors hold themselves 
internally accountable to their precommitments, such as a stated commitment 
to counteract implicit racial bias or to prioritize certain kinds of cases.75  The 
discipline of grounding one’s decisions in relevant facts and acceptable 
reasons can help ensure that those decisions “are not made arbitrarily, or 
based on speculation, suspicion, or irrelevant information.”76  Thus, there is 
intrinsic value in reason-giving.77  A prosecutor may form an initial opinion 
of the proper outcome in a case, only to find that it does not survive reasoned 
analysis.  In the context of judicial opinions, this is often referred to “as the 
‘it won’t write’ phenomenon.”78  Writing for potential public consumption 
provides an additional level of discipline and constraint.79  Knowing that her 
reasoning may be critically evaluated by different audiences and compared 
to other like cases, a prosecutor is incentivized to imagine those external 
evaluations in advance.  The result is likely to be an even more thorough and 
thoughtfully reached decision, one less prone to the influence of biases—
 
binding,” a process whereby “a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some 
later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have performed without that prior 
act”). 
 75 See, e.g., David Alan Sklansky, The Progressive Prosecutor’s Handbook, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 25, 26 (2017) (explaining that a “growing number of chief prosecutors 
have won office by pledging a more balanced approach to criminal justice — more attentive 
to racial disparities, the risk of wrongful conviction, the problem of police violence, and the 
failures and terrible costs of mass incarceration.”). 
 76 Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law 
Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 512 (2015). 
 77 See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1285 
(2009) (“[A]n authoritative decision maker has a responsibility to herself to reach a decision 
that she finds acceptable in light of her knowledge of the relevant facts and circumstances.”). 
 78 Cohen, supra note 76, at 511; see also Richard Posner, Judges’ Writing Styles (And Do 
They Matter?), 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1447 (1995); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of 
Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1375 (1995). 
 79 See Andrew E. Taslitz & Stephen E. Henderson, Reforming the Grand Jury to Protect 
Privacy in Third Party Records, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 195, 219–20 (2014) (“Social science 
demonstrates that actors believing they will be held accountable are more likely to work 
carefully and less likely to engage in error, and thus are more likely to make sound decisions 
and less likely to make irrational or ill-informed ones.”). 
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although not necessarily free of bias altogether.80  Further, keeping a corpus 
of declination statements can help prosecutors create and maintain 
institutional memory for themselves and their successors about how they 
exercised their negative discretion. 
b. Accountability to the Public 
Declination statements also promote prosecutors’ accountability to the 
public they serve.81  Absent a declination statement, the public can eventually 
surmise that a prosecutor had declined to press charges with respect to a given 
matter, but that decision would be hard to pin down and might surface too 
late for there to be any meaningful accountability for it.  For example, 
Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s decision not to pursue sexual assault 
allegations against Harvey Weinstein in 201582 and not to pursue fraud 
allegations against Ivanka and Donald Trump Jr. in 201283 came to light only 
years later as the result of investigative reporting.  In the vast majority of 
United States jurisdictions where chief District Attorneys and Attorneys 
General are elected every few years,84 this is a particularly important point.85  
 
 80 Cohen, supra note 76, at 513. For a review of the social science literature debating the 
effect of public accountability on a decision-maker’s reasoning process, see id. at 513 n.176 
and sources cited therein. At the end of the day, the brain is so complex that it is difficult for 
decisionmakers to control their reasoning process; indeed, the laudable effects of 
accountability may be offset by others that are “perverse.” Id. (citing Robert J. MacCoun, 
Psychological Constraints on Transparency in Legal and Government Decision Making, 12 
SWISS POL. SCI. REV. 112 (2006)); see also Chad M. Oldfather, Writing, Cognition, and the 
Nature of the Judicial Function, 96 GEO. L.J. 1283, 1285 (2008). Given the contested nature 
of the social science literature in this area, I am hesitant to make too strong a claim in this 
regard. 
 81 Other scholars also have pointed to the accountability benefits of prosecutors publicly 
explaining their declinations. See, e.g., Fairfax, supra note 30, at 1277 (noting that public 
declination statements could “better inform the public (including potential voters) and, 
perhaps, oversight committees”); id. at 1277 n.139 (citing sources). Fairfax was particularly 
concerned about prosecutorial accounting for what he described as nullification, i.e. the refusal 
to prosecute because of disagreement with the laws. See generally id. 
 82 See Wang & McKinley Jr., supra note 23. 
 83 See Eisinger et al., supra note 24; McIntire, supra note 24. 
 84 See Ronald F. Wright, Beyond Prosecutor Elections, 67 SMU L. REV. 593, 598–99 
(2014) (describing method of selection of chief prosecutors). 
 85 I do not want to overstate the likelihood that voters will hold prosecutors accountable 
for one, or even a bundle, of declination decisions. There is a well-developed political science 
literature debating “whether voters use elections as opportunities to sanction incumbents for 
their prior decisions, as opposed to selecting the best available representative for an upcoming 
term.” Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1269; see also Anthony C. Thompson, It Takes A 
Community to Prosecute, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 353 (2002) (on low voter turnout for 
prosecutorial elections in neighborhoods with high crime rates). On prosecutors being re-
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Put together with other data, including about charges filed and convictions 
obtained, information about declinations can provide voters with a much 
richer picture of prosecutors’ work than is currently available in most 
jurisdictions.86 
However, even appointed prosecutors such as the Attorneys General of 
a few states and the United States Attorneys in the ninety-seven federal 
districts can be subject to indirect political pressure.  Unpopular declination 
decisions could be raised as a campaign issue for the elected official who 
appointed the prosecutor and the elected legislators with oversight 
authority.87  Unelected prosecutors also care, to varying degrees, about their 
public image88 and popularity.89  Some may aspire to higher political office; 
 
elected, see, e.g., Bibas, supra note 8, at 961 (“District Attorneys’ electoral contests are rarely 
measured assessments of a prosecutor’s overall performance. At best, campaign issues boil 
down to boasts about conviction rates, a few high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal. The 
advantages of incumbency . . . are also huge.”); id. at 984 (discussing low voter turnout for 
prosecutorial elections and voters’ reliance on “memorable but unrepresentative stories”); 
Wright, supra note 84, at 600–05; Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 581, 582–83 (2009); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide 
Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1587, 1606 (2010). In the 
case of Manhattan District Attorney Vance, his declination decisions in the Weinstein and 
Trump cases surfaced too late for them to impact his 2013 reelection but before his 2017 
election campaign, which he won. However, there are also counterexamples of prosecutors 
who were defeated after widely publicized decisions in which they declined to prosecute 
police. See, e.g., Ed Krayewski, Prosecutors in Chicago, Cleveland Lose Re-Election Bids 
After Police Abuse Controversies, REASON (Mar. 6, 2016), https://reason.com/2016/03/16/pr
osecutors-in-chicago-cleveland-lose-re/printer/ [https://perma.cc/3HTN-6TDL]. 
 86 See, e.g., supra note 8, at 989 (discussing the lack of information available to help voters 
monitor prosecutors). 
 87 See Frances Robles, Prosecutors’ Softer Line Leads to Rigid Backlash, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 31, 2017, at A10 (discussing measures considered by Florida legislators to cut off 
funding from Orlando prosecutor who announced she would not pursue the death penalty, and 
Governor’s removal of her from pending case). 
 88 See Buell, supra note 66, at 838–39 (discussing various career advancement goals that 
may drive federal prosecutors’ public statements about cases). 
 89 For that reason, even an un-elected prosecutor might defer the announcement of a 
controversial declination until the eve of her departure. For example, in 2002, then-United 
States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Mary Jo White waited until the day 
before she stepped down from her post to leave for private practice to announce that she was 
declining to file charges against New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli after a four-year, well-
publicized public corruption investigation. See David Kocieniewski & Tim Golden, Charges 
Ruled Out as U.S. Concludes Torricelli Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2002), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2002/01/04/nyregion/charges-ruled-out-as-us-concludes-torricelli-inquiry.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/7YYC-FXPA]. Ms. White stated that her office had concluded its “exhaustive 
investigation” without seeking an indictment and would refer information developed to the 
Senate Ethics Committee. Id. She declined to provide further detail about her reasoning. Id. In 
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others may simply have internalized their role as servants of the geographic 
communities they represent.90  Either way, public expressions of 
dissatisfaction with how the prosecutor has exercised declination authority 
could impact how the prosecutor exercises that discretion going forward. 
c. Accountability to Other Institutions 
Declination statements also enhance prosecutors’ accountability to the 
law enforcement agencies with whom they work regularly.  As noted in 
Section I(B)(1)(b), such statements can signal prosecutors’ respect, promote 
institutional comity, and provide a mechanism for conveying messages about 
how law enforcement agents could do better.  But they also provide a means 
for agencies to check that prosecutors are in fact doing the work that the 
agencies understand to be their collective project.  Law enforcement agencies 
can hold prosecutors accountable through a variety of methods, including 
taking future cases to other offices91 and airing their grievances with the press 
or other institutions.92  Most likely, they can use their own soft authority with 
 
2008, then-United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York Michael J. Garcia 
waited until he was about to leave for private practice to announce that his office had decided 
not to file charges against Elliot Spitzer after it had become public that Spitzer, while the 
Governor of New York, had arranged for women to travel interstate for the purpose of 
engaging in acts of prostitution with him. See Hakim & Rashbaum, supra note 63. The media 
also can impose pressure on prosecutors. See Bibas, supra note 8, at 983–88. 
 90 As Sam Buell has written, even appointed prosecutors “seem to share an abiding and 
reasonable belief that because their ‘client’ is the public, the client has a right to know what 
the prosecutor is doing and should, in some general sense, approve of and support the 
prosecutor’s work.” Buell, supra note 66, at 840. 
 91 See Richman, supra note 44, at 759–62. 
 92 See, e.g., John Bresnahan, FBI Whistleblower: Violations Occurred During Ted 
Stevens’ Probe & Trial, POLITICO (Dec. 22, 2008), https://www.politico.com/blogs/politico-
now/2008/12/fbi-whistleblower-violations-occurred-during-ted-stevens-probe-trial-014962 
[https://perma.cc/9VN7-4QZL] (describing an FBI agent’s whistleblower complaint to a 
federal district court judge alleging DOJ prosecutorial misconduct prior to, and during, former 
senator Ted Stevens’ trial); Jeannie Suk Gersen, Why Didn’t the Manhattan D.A. Cyrus Vance 
Prosecute the Trumps or Harvey Weinstein?, THE NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www
.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-didnt-manhattan-da-cyrus-vance-prosecute-the-trump
s-or-harvey-weinstein [https://perma.cc/3M6H-TC7A] (quoting an N.Y.P.D. statement 
expressing disagreement with the Manhattan District Attorney’s insufficient evidence 
determination following the Harvey Weinstein investigation); Ted Oberg, Critics Complain 
Harris County DA Not Tough Enough on Crime, ABC 13 (Dec. 27, 2018), 
https://abc13.com/3089352/ [https://perma.cc/8XL5-DW7X] (detailing multiple police 
complaints about the Harris County District Attorney’s decisions not to prosecute); Ali 
Watkins, Police Officials and Prosecutor Feud Over Case About Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
12, 2019, at A16 (describing statement on Twitter by the N.Y.P.D. Police Commissioner 
decrying Manhattan District Attorney’s declination of charges against men beaten by police 
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prosecutors, and the capital built through decades of working together, to 
raise concerns directly with prosecutors whose decisions do not comport with 
prior understandings and standards. 
Similarly, declination statements facilitate prosecutorial accountability 
to other government institutions.  Legislative committees may have oversight 
authority93 and budgetary responsibility for the prosecutors’ office.94  
Executive branch actors may have oversight and even removal authority over 
prosecutors.95  In exercising those powers, information about prosecutors’ 
declination decisions can be just as useful as information about prosecutors’ 
decisions to charge.  Similarly, prosecutors with overlapping jurisdiction can 
hold each other accountable through the aggressive assertion of 
jurisdiction.96  For example, a federal prosecutor who brings a case declined 
by a local prosecutor may do so in part to express disapproval of the latter’s 
decision, and may be less deferential in future cases that both prosecutors 
have an interest in charging.97 
 
during chaotic arrest). As Dan Richman has observed, “iterated interaction between police and 
prosecutors is not unique to liberal democracies,” but in an “open society and a media 
interested in crime news, the arguments easily spill into public discourse.” Richman, supra 
note 44, at 751–52. 
 93 See supra notes 39 and 54; see also Press Release, Sheldon Whitehouse, United States 
Senator for Rhode Island, Senators Whitehouse, Hassan Press Justice Department for 2006 
Purdue Pharma Prosecution Memo (Sept. 9, 2019) (detailing request by Senators for 
information about case related to Purdue Pharma’s role in the opioid crisis), 
https://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/senators-whitehouse-hassan-press-justice-
department-for-2006-purdue-pharma-prosecution-memo [https://perma.cc/3686-AKK9]. 
 94 See Robles, supra note 87. 
 95 In some states, such as New York, the Governor has the authority to remove an elected 
District Attorney from office. See ARK. CONST. art. XV, § 3; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 4, para. 5; 
N.Y. CONST. art. XIII, § 13(a); PA. CONST. art. VI, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. 6, § 4, para. 4; see 
also Eric R. Daleo, Note, The Scope and Limits of the New Jersey Governor’s Authority to 
Remove the Attorney General and Others “For Cause,” 39 RUTGERS L. J. 393 (2008); Wang 
& McKinley Jr., supra note 23 (discussing review by New York Attorney General’s Office of 
Manhattan District Attorney’s Office ordered by the Governor); Michael Gormley, Governor 
Has Little-Used Power to Remove Elected Official, NEWSDAY (May 12, 2016), https://www.
newsday.com/news/region-state/governor-has-power-to-remove-an-elected-official-but-it-s-r
arely-used-1.11793506 [https://perma.cc/3T9M-3JS4] (describing New York Governor 
Andrew Cuomo’s constitutional removal power). 
 96 See Brown, supra note 38, at 884 (“[R]edundant federal-state authority has evolved into 
a means—unusual even among federal nation-states—to second-guess and effectively trump 
state prosecutors’ declination decisions.”). 
 97 See, e.g., Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on the Shooting 
of Six Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/st
atement-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-police [https://
perma.cc/GA6U-YXLR] (statement by United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
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d. Accountability of Other Institutions 
In addition to promoting prosecutorial accountability, declination 
statements can be a tool for holding law enforcement agencies and 
legislatures accountable for their official actions.98  As noted above,99 
prosecutors can use their declinations to call attention to the limitations of 
existing laws and legislators’ failure to remedy them.100  So too, declination 
statements can bring internal and external pressure to bear on law 
enforcement agencies, to the extent that their actions (or inaction) are 
perceived as undermining worthwhile prosecutions.101  Thus, for example, if 
the police are regularly engaging in unlawful searches,102 prosecutors can call 
attention to those practices and how they make it difficult, or in some cases 
impossible, for prosecutors to bring charges.  Similarly, if police consistently 
are failing to investigate cases adequately, such that prosecutors lack 
sufficient evidence to proceed, calling out those failures can prompt 
corrective action.103  Likewise, if a prosecutor becomes aware of racially 
 
Pennsylvania criticizing Philadelphia’s elected district attorney Larry Krasner, saying, “My 
Office is doing all that we can. We have prosecuted 70% more violent crime cases this year 
than we did last year, in response to the District Attorney’s lawlessness.”). 
 98 See Richman, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that prosecutors enjoy a privileged position 
“to promote the accountability of other actors in the criminal justice system”). 
 99 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
 100 See, e.g., Kylie McGivern, Prosecutors Call Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ Law 
Unconstitutional, ABC ACTION NEWS (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news
/state/prosecutors-call-florida-s-stand-your-ground-law-unconstitutional [https://perma.cc/7T
ET-WBU4] (quoting a statement of the Hillsborough County State Attorney, which described 
the new version of Florida’s stand your ground law as an “ill-conceived solution . . . that 
predictably created confusion and gridlock in [the] courts, which is now wasting taxpayer 
resources and delaying justice for victims”); David Ovalle, Florida’s Stand Your Ground law 
is Unconstitutional, Miami’s Top Prosecutor Tells High Court, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 30, 
2018), https://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/Florida-s-Stand-Your-Ground-law-is-u
nconstitutional-Miami-s-top-prosecutor-tells-high-court_173107373/ [https://perma.cc/76M5
-S72R] (describing the Miami-Dade State Attorney’s, and other Miami prosecutors’, negative 
stance toward a recently enacted law shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution to disprove 
a defendant’s claim of self-defense). 
 101 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jess Bidgood, Prosecutors Say Baltimore Police 
Mishandled Freddie Gray Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/20
16/07/29/us/freddie-gray-baltimore.html [https://perma.cc/TL5Z-HWP7] (describing the 
Baltimore State Attorney’s blaming of the Baltimore Police Department for failing to 
adequately investigate the death of Freddie Gray, resulting in the inability to effectively 
prosecute the charged officers). 
 102 See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 137–41, 166. 
 103 See, e.g., Memorandum to Grant County Sheriff from Jim Carpenter, Grant County 
District Attorney (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2852371-KOI
TZSCH-DA-Dismissal.html [https://perma.cc/355U-GZNG] (explaining decision not to 
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discriminatory practices by police, she can call attention to that practice in 
order to change it.104 
e. Declination Data for Context 
For all of the foregoing purposes, declination statements that provide 
context for the prosecutors’ decision are likely to promote accountability 
better than those that merely announce a decision not to charge.  Absent that 
context, any assessment of the prosecutor’s action may be unreliable.  In any 
given case, it is possible that any reasonable prosecutor would have declined 
to charge because the evidence was so lacking or the mitigating 
circumstances so compelling.  But no one outside the prosecutor’s office will 
know that unless the prosecution explains his or her reasoning.105  As Kate 
Levine has observed regarding prosecutors’ decisions not to charge police 
officers for on-duty shootings, any individual decision not to prosecute may 
well be justified, but that reality will not be known to either “the public nor 
other systems actors”106 if the decision is made “behind closed doors.”107  
Thus, declination statements can provide the information necessary to hold 
prosecutors meaningfully accountable, including as measured against the 
prosecutors’ own previously-stated commitments.108  When it comes to 
public accountability, even a few politically salient declination statements 
 
charge in case involving dispute among close friends, pointing to the lack of any record of 
certain witness interviews and offering “While your policies may differ, [law enforcement] 
investigations of relatives and close friends will be reviewed with a skeptical eye . . . . [T]he 
matter should be reviewed using objective criteria before making any arrest.”). 
 104 See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 166. 
 105 For example, the lawyer for the family of Trayvon Martin, who was killed by George 
Zimmerman in Florida in 2012, called the public statement by the DOJ explaining its decision 
not to file federal criminal charges “inadequate,” but noted that at least it gave ‘some insight’ 
into how the decision had been reached.” He stated, “My feeling is that people deserve 
answers.” Weiser, supra note 16. 
 106 Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1482 
(2016). 
 107 Id. 
 108 On the value of reason-giving in promoting government accountability more generally, 
see Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1281–82; see also Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution 
Making, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS 
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Jane Schacter, Ely and the Idea of 
Democracy, 57 STAN. L. REV. 737 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 633 (1995). 
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may better promote accountability than more formal mechanisms of 
review.109 
One caveat here is that this function is dependent upon the prosecutor 
accurately portraying her reasons for the declination.110  If the real reason is 
not considered publicly acceptable, the prosecutor may deliberately or 
unconsciously111 set forth other reasons that are, thus depriving the public of 
the information necessary to reliably assess the prosecutor’s decision.  For 
this reason, a critical mass of data about declinations, even if they are not all 
detailed, also is important for accountability purposes.  Where there is more 
data, patterns emerge.112  For example, a prosecutor who repeatedly declines 
to press charges in sexual assault cases, or against police officers for on-duty 
shootings, will be evaluated differently from a prosecutor who declines 
rarely.  But no one will know how frequently the prosecutor is declining such 
cases unless enough of the relevant decisions are available to assess. 
3. History-Keeping 
In cases involving particularly complex investigations or high-profile 
events, declinations also can serve history-keeping interests.  History-
 
 109 See Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Powers and the President’s Power 
to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 729 (2014) (discussing the accountability dividends 
of “politically salient announcements by high-level officials”). In fact, to the extent that 
prosecutorial elections are influenced by an incumbent’s past decisions, “[d]iscussion of 
practice tends to focus on a few high-profile cases” rather than general patterns. See William 
H. Simon, The Organization of Prosecutorial Discretion, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY, 
supra note 14, at 18; see also Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, supra note 85, at 
602. 
 110 See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers 
Lie?, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2010) (noting that accountability is compromised when 
public officials disclose “insincere and misleading justifications” for their decisions); see also 
Fairfax, supra note 30, at 1280 (noting the ease with which prosecutors could come up with 
“pretextual declination rationales” and how difficult it would be for outsiders to identify 
them); Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1279. 
 111 The problem of inaccurate reason giving, of course, is not unique to prosecutors. 
Human beings in general are often unreliable relators of their own reasons, and not because 
they necessarily intend to deceive. Many scholars have discussed this problem in the context 
of judicial opinion-writing. See, e.g., Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial 
Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1318–19, 1319 n.32 (1995) (“Many omissions of candor, after 
all, are not conscious ploys on the part of judges, but rather the product of either less-than-
thorough or genuinely self-deceptive analysis.”). 
 112 As Miller and Wright have written, “[A]n explanation for a single case might reveal 
less than the patterns of government decision-making. Patterns can reveal both intentional and 
unintentional bias, and the probable grounds for judgment. Patterns [. . .] may also be useful 
in spotting ‘outlier’ cases that appear to make sense on their own terms but are harder to 
explain in a larger information-rich context.” Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 184 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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keeping is distinct from signaling and accountability in that it focuses on the 
documentation of historical facts for its own sake.  The Mueller Report—to 
the extent that it included hundreds of pages of findings about Russian 
interference in the 2016 presidential election and communications between 
Trump associates and foreign actors—fulfilled this kind of history-keeping 
function.113  As did the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) report about the 2014 
shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri by police officer 
Darren Wilson.114 
When a case is charged, this history-keeping function can be fulfilled 
through the recitation of facts in charging documents and the presentation of 
evidence and arguments at trial.  Indeed, the loss of that opportunity to 
publicly reconstruct past events is one of the many reasons to lament the 
decline in criminal trials as guilty pleas have become the norm.115  However, 
even where a case does not proceed to trial, that narrative can be relayed in 
complaints and indictments.116  Additional details can be brought out through 
 
 113 President Trump’s lawyers ridiculed this aspect of the Mueller Report, characterizing 
it as “a prosecutorial curiosity – part ‘truth commission’ report and part law school exam 
paper.” Flood Letter, supra note 21. 
 114 See, e.g., DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN 
WILSON (Mar. 4, 2015) (eighty-six page single-spaced report detailing evidence uncovered 
during Department of Justice’s investigation, discussing applicable law, and explaining why 
facts failed to meet legal requirements to charge). 
 115 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006 
(2009), https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2152 [https://perma.cc/G5CA-QTF
M] (finding that 94% of felony offenders sentenced in 2006 pleaded guilty); CSP INTERACTIVE 
TOOL, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://popup.ncsc.org/CSP/CSP_Intro.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/883J-MEJ9] (demonstrating each state’s guilty plea rate to be above 90% in 
2017); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 
2017, Table 2A (2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao/page/file/1081801/download [https://
perma.cc/P4VC-Y7X6] (stating that 65,309 dispositions of “guilty” were reached in federal 
district courts in fiscal year 2017, with 2,123 occurring after trial; therefore, about 97% of 
such guilty dispositions were reached prior to trial); Jed S. Rakoff, Why Innocent People Plead 
Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/2
0/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ [https://perma.cc/Q2GP-8J8D] (For state courts, “it is a 
rare state where plea bargains do not . . . account for the resolution of at least 95 percent of 
the felony cases that are not dismissed . . . .”). 
 116 So-called “speaking” complaints or indictments that provide an extensive narrative 
account of the prosecutor’s view of the facts are not without controversy. See, e.g., Buell, 
supra note 66, at 825 (discussing speaking indictments or informations that have become 
common in corporate prosecutions, explaining which “speak loudly, often, and at length, about 
what [DOJ] is doing and why”); id. (noting that defense attorneys usually would prefer that 
prosecutors keep their “court filings terse”); Jeffrey Toobin, The Showman: How U.S. Attorney 
Preet Bharara Struck Fear into Wall Street and Albany, NEW YORKER (May 2, 2016), https://
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plea proceedings and at sentencing.117  But when no charges are filed, the 
criminal justice system generally does not provide a means for the public to 
learn the facts that the prosecutor uncovered during the investigation.118  
Only a small number of jurisdictions permit the issuance of investigative 
grand jury reports to make public the findings of an investigation that does 
 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/09/the-man-who-terrifies-wall-street [https://perma.
cc/ZY4Z-FWVL] (quoting defense attorney Henry Mazurek’s criticism of speaking 
complaints filed in the Southern District of New York as “unnerving and disturbing and 
fundamentally unfair”). However, prosecutors have defended such instruments as offering the 
best opportunity, in a world in which most charged cases do not go to trial, to educate the 
public about the events that transpired and why they constitute a crime. See, e.g., id. (quoting 
former Deputy U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York Richard Zabel, who 
explained the value of speaking complaints, like those filed against New York Assembly 
Speaker Sheldon Silver, in explaining to the public why something is a crime). In some cases, 
prosecutors file lengthy speaking indictments even when there is no reasonable prospect that 
the defendants will be brought to court to face the charges—as with the thirteen Russian 
nationals charged by Special Counsel Robert Mueller with conspiracy to defraud the United 
States for their attempt to interfere in the 2016 United States Presidential election. As some 
have noted, the chief value of those indictments was to inform the public about what had 
occurred, as uncovered through the Special Counsel’s investigation. Amelia Thomson-
DeVeaux & Perry Bacon Jr., What If We Already Have the Mueller Report?, 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Dec. 5, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/what-if-we-already-ha
ve-the-mueller-report/ [https://perma.cc/YV7K-VFGB] (“Mueller has been writing a public 
‘report’ over the past 15 months, through the indictments and charging documents that his 
office has issued. Many of the indictments, describing what Mueller and his team have found, 
are more detailed than required.”). 
 117 In many guilty plea proceedings, the government and the defendant make a 
presentation about the factual basis for the plea. Indeed, in federal court, the judge must find 
there is an adequate factual basis for the plea before accepting it. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). 
In corporate prosecutions, even those resolved by a deferred prosecution agreement or non-
prosecution agreement prosecutors often require defendant corporations to agree to a lengthy 
statement of facts. See Buell, supra note 66, at 856 (discussing evolution of “speaking 
settlements” and encouraging their use so that “the facts become a lasting and indisputable 
record of the case”). 
 118 Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 2173, 2216 (2014) (stating that the public’s right to information regarding individual 
criminal cases “does not extend . . . to pre-arrest investigations”); Jocelyn Simonson, The 
Place of “The People” in Criminal Procedure, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 262 (2019) (stating 
that our criminal court system “keep[s] individual cases against defendants free of public 
interference, except in the rare case of a jury trial”) (emphasis in original). 
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not lead to criminal charges.119  Unlike other executive branch agencies120 or 
legislatures, prosecutors do not have general authority to hold investigative 
hearings or issue reports based upon their findings.121  And although freedom 
of information laws often provide a mechanism for the public and members 
of the press to obtain, upon request, information in police and prosecutors’ 
files once an investigation is over, prosecutors’ memoranda reconstructing 
events often are protected from disclosure under exemptions for work 
product or protecting the deliberative process.122 
This constitutes a significant loss from the perspective of history-
keeping.  Prosecutors may have the best access to the evidence while it is 
fresh.123  They also are specialists in investigations, who are often uniquely 
competent to construct a narrative of what occurred given their familiarity 
 
 119 See, e.g., Richard H. Kuh, The Grand Jury “Presentment”: Foul Blow or Fair Play?, 
55 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1110–14 (1955) (surveying which jurisdictions permit grand jury 
reports). For examples of recent grand jury reports, see N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, REPORT OF 
THE GRAND JURY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (Dec. 13, 2018) 
(documenting widespread fraud in the conveyance of residential real estate in New York); 
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., COMMONWEALTH OF P.A., REPORT I OF THE 40TH STATEWIDE 
INVESTIGATING GRAND JURY (July 27, 2018) (documenting widespread sex abuse by clergy in 
Pennsylvania). 
 120 For example, the National Transportation Safety Bureau (NTSB) and the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) are authorized to issue investigative reports. 
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1155 (2018) (authorizing NTSB to issue reports based upon their 
investigations of accidents); 29 C.F.R. § 1614 (2010) (authorizing the same for EEOC). 
 121 Special Counsel Robert Mueller was required under the Department of Justice 
Regulations governing his appointment to issue a final report to the Attorney General 
explaining his prosecution and declination decisions, but it was not clear before he issued his 
report that it would include such extensive factual findings. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 600.1–600.09 
(2020). By contrast, under the Independent Counsel Law that expired prior to Mueller’s 
appointment, Independent Counsels were required to issue a report “fully and completely” 
describing the Counsel’s work. See Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. 
L. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732. In the ordinary course, prosecutors do not have any express 
authority to issue such reports. For example, the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division 
states that it generally “does not publicly announce investigations or investigative findings.” 
When Does the Division Announce Investigations?, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 
(last updated Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/crt/when-does-division-announce-
investigations [perma.cc/CQ5T-P25H]. Further complicating the picture, to the extent that 
prosecutors acquire information through use of the Grand Jury, they are legally constrained 
from disclosing that information absent an indictment. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d)–(e); 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.25(4)(a). 
 122 See, e.g., Worldnetdaily.Com, v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F.Supp.3d 81 (D.D.C. 
2016). 
 123 See, e.g., MUELLER REPORT, supra note 19, at Vol. II (explaining that one rationale for 
the Special Counsel’s ongoing investigation, even after the Office determined that it would 
not charge or even accuse a sitting President, was to collect and preserve evidence while it 
was fresh and available). 
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with the available facts, even as compared to other institutions that also have 
subpoena power.124  To be sure, prosecutors are imperfect and are susceptible 
to the same cognitive biases as other humans,125 so the accuracy of any report 
that has not been subjected to external review or an adversarial process must 
be viewed with those limitations in mind.126  Nevertheless, when prosecutors 
acting in good faith decide upon a version of events after a thorough 
investigation, there is reason to think that summary is valuable and can have 
a high degree of accuracy.  And although this is not universally the case, 
prosecutors’ reconstructions of events are often credited because of the 
privileged status they enjoy in our society as truth-tellers.127 
As discussed above, one rationale for issuing detailed declination 
statements is to provide accountability for the prosecutor’s decision not to 
press charges.  But even when there is no one left to hold accountable—for 
example, if the targets of an investigation were deceased, or the prosecutor 
 
 124 See, e.g., Minzner, supra note 62, at 2133–34 (discussing some of the advantages of 
prosecutors over employees at administrative agencies, such as their greater expertise in 
working with informants); see also Richman, supra note 14, at 55–56 (noting that prosecutors 
are uniquely positioned to “preserve what might be unstable evidence of criminal conduct”). 
 125 See Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & LIBERTY 512, 516–20 (2007); Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutor Risk, 
Maturation, and Wrongful Conviction Practice, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 648 (2017); Jessica 
A. Roth, Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful Convictions, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
737, 774–77 (2016). 
 126 See Flood Letter, supra note 21 (complaining that the Mueller Report was “laden with 
factual information that has never been subjected to adversarial testing or independent 
analysis”). By contrast, in cases that proceed to trial, a jury serves as the final check on the 
accuracy of prosecutors’ allegations, and witnesses are subjected to cross-examination, which 
has long been hailed as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth.” 
See 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW, § 1367 (James H. 
Chadbourn rev. 1974). But even before trial, the system provides external checks in cases 
where charges are filed: criminal complaints are sworn, subjecting the affiant to penalty of 
perjury, and must be approved by a neutral magistrate judge, who can catch inconsistencies or 
patently implausible assertions. Indictments must be approved by a Grand Jury. These checks 
may be of questionable rigor. See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and 
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 261 (1995). However, their very 
existence may cause prosecutors to evaluate their cases more carefully. See id. at 278 
(suggesting that the screening function of the Grand Jury actually takes place largely in the 
prosecutor’s office, as prosecutors decide whether to present the case to the Grand Jury). 
 127  See also Matthew Haag, Police Report in Killing of Black Security Guard Is Criticized 
as Rushed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/security-
guard-shot-by-cops-jemel-roberson.html [https://perma.cc/4BNG-KWP4] (describing 
negative public reaction to preliminary findings exonerating police officer, announced by 
Illinois State Police, three days after deadly encounter); see, e.g., Bennett Gershman, The 
Prosecutor’s Duty of Silence, 79 ALB. L. REV. 1183, 1215 (2015) (observing that the 
prosecutor traditionally has enjoyed the status in our culture as the “special guardian and 
protector of the truth”).  
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were on her way out of office—the public often will want to know the truth 
about culturally and politically salient events.128  Absent an authoritative 
statement from a trusted source, the public is left uncomfortably in the dark; 
even worse, they are left to speculate about blame, potentially fueling 
resentment and disharmony.129  Reporting “what happened” is important for 
the mechanisms of democratic accountability to function, particularly when 
the targets of an investigation hold public office.  But it is also important for 
democratic self-understanding and reconciliation more broadly, as well as for 
communities’ ability to chart the path forward.130 
C. THE RISKS POSED BY DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
Although declination statements can serve many interests, they also 
pose risks.  That is why historically they have been rare, and why the norm 
of silence continues to prevail.  As will be discussed in Part III, it is also why 
public declination statements—to the extent they identify a particular 
individual—should remain rare. 
1. Law Enforcement Risks 
To begin, prosecutors often will be reluctant to issue a declination 
statement for law enforcement reasons.  Even if the prosecutor has decided 
not to charge a particular individual, the investigation may be ongoing as to 
others and a declination statement as to that individual could undermine the 
rest of the investigation by bringing it to public attention.131  This reasoning 
is the same as the traditional justification for grand jury secrecy.132  In some 
 
 128 As James Comey has argued, “[i]n critical matters of national importance, a 
straightforward report of what facts have been learned and how judgment has been exercised 
may be the only way to advance the public interest.” James Comey, Republicans Are Wrong. 




 129 See Haag, supra note 127 (noting public dissatisfaction with report issued by Illinois 
State Police regarding police shooting within days after the event, where findings were 
characterized as “rushed” and police did not explain basis for their findings). 
 130 See, e.g., PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF 
TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2002) (examining  major truth commissions around the world); 
MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER 
GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); Phillip Tahmindjis, The Role and Value of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, 27 INT’L LEGAL PRAC. 133, 134–35 (2002). 
 131 See infra note 138. 
 132 See, e.g., Douglas Oil v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1979); 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399 (1959); United States v. Proctor & 
Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 681 n.6 (1958). 
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cases, declinations could compromise methods and sources that prosecutors 
prefer to keep secret—e.g., by necessarily revealing that someone close to a 
target was cooperating with law enforcement.  Prosecutors also might be 
reluctant to announce a declination because their view of the case might 
change and they are concerned about being bound by their earlier decision—
if not in law, then in perception.133  Secrecy also maximizes deterrence of 
future wrongful conduct, since uncertainty as to prosecutors’ priorities and 
application of the criminal law may lead potential wrongdoers to err on the 
side of caution.134 
2. Risk of Error 
In addition, any information that is disclosed might be wrong or could 
subsequently become refuted by further investigation.135  Leaving false 
information in the public realm disserves any of the interests advanced by 
declination statements.  It also is inconsistent with the prosecutor’s role as a 
minister of justice136 and undermines the prosecutor’s credibility, if the error 
is later discovered.  Additionally, having to correct prior statements could 
undermine the prosecutor’s credibility if the prosecutor is seen as unreliable 
and inconsistent.  Subsequent updates may confuse the public and lead to a 
self-reinforcing cycle of public statements as events change.  For this reason, 
 
 133 See Sklansky, supra note 4, at 519 (noting the “persistent worries about publicly-
announced charging criteria being turned into ‘litigation weapons’”). 
 134 See id. at 518–19 (noting concern that “if prosecutors made their charging criteria 
public, they would no longer be able to soften the edges of the law without significantly 
undermining deterrence”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Overseeing Agency Enforcement, 84 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1129, at 1154–59 (2016) (discussing concerns that greater transparency 
in enforcement priorities could reduce deterrence); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File 
Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 246, 297 (1980) (expressing concern that, if prosecutors publicize which cases they deem 
unworthy of prosecution, such publication could “reduce the legitimate deterrent and 
moralizing effects of the criminal law”); supra notes 62–65 and sources cited therein 
(discussing the informationally asymmetry between insiders who have access to prosecutors’ 
previous declination decisions based on personal experience or pooled resources, and 
outsiders who do not). 
 135 For example, James Comey’s initial representation that the Hillary Clinton email 
investigation was closed was rendered incorrect by the subsequent discovery of additional 
emails on a laptop computer used by her close associate. The FBI then re-opened the 
investigation, prompting Comey to so apprise Congress. See infra note 185; see also Eric 
Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Chief James Comey Is in Political Crossfire Again Over Emails, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/29/us/politics/fbi-clinton-emails-ja
mes-comey.html [https://perma.cc/QKW7-XLPN] (describing Comey’s October 28, 2016, 
letter to Congress revealing that the FBI was reviewing new emails related to the investigation 
found in the course of an unrelated investigation). 
 136 See A.B.A., Rule 3.8, supra note 11. 
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Daniel Richman observed that the prosecutor’s “safest move is always to 
never say anything and let the target twist in the wind.”137 
3. Risk of Reputational Harm 
Declination statements also pose significant risks to the privacy and 
reputational interests of witnesses and those who were under investigation.  
These concerns also animate the traditional reasons for grand jury secrecy,138 
in addition to the norm against public statements about declinations.  
Grounding the decision in a specific legal requirement that cannot be 
overcome, such as the statute of limitations or the prosecutor’s inability to 
prove a particular element, may seem innocuous enough and serves some of 
the signaling and accountability interests discussed herein.  But such a 
statement might imply that the evidence otherwise was sufficient to charge.  
And, depending on the case, even such discrete explanations can quickly 
invite further inquiries and lead to a call for further explication: precisely 
what the evidence was, how it was insufficient, were specific witnesses not 
credible, etc. 
Once that door is open, prosecutors are on uncertain ground.  
Prosecutors’ public statements regarding witness credibility and personal 
beliefs about a target’s guilt or moral culpability are not permitted when 
charges are filed for a number of reasons, including their potential to unfairly 
prejudice a future jury.139  When no charges are filed, the risk to a fair trial 
may be absent but the risks to the target’s reputation are accentuated.  
Without the public forum provided by the criminal process, a target has no 
means to clear his or her name or correct mistakes of fact.  That is why grand 
jury reports have fallen out of favor in the federal system,140 and the DOJ 
long ago adopted a policy against naming unindicted co-conspirators.141  
 
 137 Weiser, supra note 16 (quoting Daniel Richman). 
 138 See United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting danger of 
naming unindicted co-conspirators who will have “no forum in which the vindicate 
themselves”). 
 139 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.2 (2020); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.6 (2015). 
Statements about prosecutors’ personal opinions also typically run afoul of rules prohibiting 
lawyers from serving as both advocates and witnesses in the same case. 
 140 See 18 U.S.C. § 3333 (2020) and accompanying notes; see also DOJ, JUSTICE 
MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 159. 
 141 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-27.760 – Limitations on Identifying 
Uncharged Third-Parties Publicly (citing the “privacy and reputational interests of uncharged 
third parties” are reason not to identify them in plea hearings, sentencing memoranda, and 
other governmental pleadings); DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-11.130 – 
Limitations on Naming Persons Unindicted Co-Conspirators (“In the absence of some 
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Even in jurisdictions that still authorize grand juries to issue investigative 
reports, individuals’ names are often redacted to protect privacy and 
reputational interests before the reports are released to the public—as, for 
example, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 2018 ordered priests’ 
names to be redacted from a grand jury report about sexual abuse within the 
Catholic Church.142  The value of protecting individuals’ privacy and 
reputational interests also explains why those portions of prosecutors’ public 
declination statements characterizing a target’s conduct as wrongful, or 
opining about witness credibility, have proven so particularly 
controversial.143  As one commentator has observed, “The DOJ’s publication 
of declinations with even moderately detailed factual statements creates 
reputational damage.”144  Even high-profile targets who have a more visible 
 
significant justification, federal prosecutors generally should not identify unindicted co-
conspirators in conspiracy indictments”); see also United States v. Briggs, 514 F.2d 794, 802 
(5th Cir. 1992) (noting danger of naming unindicted co-conspirators who will have “no forum 
in which to vindicate themselves”). Similarly, courts also have long upheld exemption from 
Freedom of Information Act Requests for information that would confirm whether an 
individual had been a subject of investigation to protect their privacy. See, e.g., Massey v. 
F.B.I., 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]ndividuals have substantial privacy interests in 
information that either confirms or suggests that they have been subject to criminal 
investigations or proceedings.”). 
 142 See In re Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 190 A.3d 560, 573 (Pa. 2018) 
(quoting Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of E. Pa., 923 A.2d 389, 395 n.7 (Pa. 
2007)) (noting that the Pennsylvania Constitution places “reputational interests on the highest 
plane, that is, on the same level as those pertaining to life, liberty, and property” and affording 
targets named in the report the opportunity to be heard prior to publication); see also In re 
Fortieth Statewide Investigating Grand Jury, 197 A.3d 712 (Pa. 2018) (ordering names of 
eleven priests permanently redacted from Grand Jury Report).  
 143 For example, James Comey’s characterization of Hillary Clinton’s conduct as 
“extremely careless” was widely criticized. See infra note 187. So too was the public statement 
by a Connecticut prosecutor who declined to prosecute Woody Allen but publicly stated that 
he believed he had enough evidence to charge him. See Henneberger, supra note 71 (quoting 
legal ethics expert Stephen Gillers’ statement in reaction to the prosecutor’s public statements 
that, “You don’t declare the man guilty and then say you’re not going to prosecute, leaving 
him to defend himself in the press . . . I can’t overemphasize how remarkable this is.”); 
Weiser, supra note 16 (quoting Gillers’ statement that “a prosecutor has two choices: indict 
or shut up”) (quoting law professor Rebecca Roiphe, who called prosecutors’ increasingly 
common public commentary on cases without filing charges “extremely problematic”); see 
also Richard Perez-Pena, Woody Allen Asks Connecticut to Discipline Prosecutor, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 14, 1993), https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/14/nyregion/woody-allen-asks-connectic
ut-to-discipline-prosecutor.html [https://perma.cc/FR4Y-4BTQ] (quoting former Assistant 
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, and now Second Circuit Judge, 
Hon. Gerard E. Lynch, as saying “It’s always inappropriate for a prosecutor to say anything 
about a case in which no charges are brought . . . [a]nd to say, ‘We think the guy is guilty’ is 
outrageous.”). 
 144 Gideon Mark, The Yates Memorandum, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1589, 1649 (2018). 
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platform from which to rebut the prosecutor’s statements than the average 
person still may be unable to fully mitigate the harm caused by prosecutors’ 
express or implied assertions of misconduct.145 
Notably, executive actors other than prosecutors can issue public 
statements that shame targets as a means of providing accountability (as well 
as specific and general deterrence) and are explicitly authorized to do so.  For 
example, the SEC has the authority under its governing statutes to issue a 
letter detailing misconduct, including the identities of those specifically 
involved in it, when it has decided against an enforcement action but thinks 
publicity of the facts uncovered during its investigation would be in the 
public interest.146  Prosecutors can charge-bargain, defer prosecution, and 
make use of diversionary programs as means of achieving what they deem to 
be a just outcome.  However, shaming through public statements, uncoupled 
from any other official action, is not a generally accepted option in the 
prosecutor’s toolkit.147 
 
 145 As former Labor Secretary Raymond Donovan famously said following his acquittal 
on state fraud charges, “Which office do I go to to get my reputation back?” Selwyn Taab, 
Donovan Cleared of Fraud Charges by Jury in Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 1987), https://
www.nytimes.com/1987/05/26/nyregion/donovan-cleared-of-fraud-charges-by-jury-in-bronx
.html [https://perma.cc/2M4C-G5GG]. A person who has never been charged stands in a 
different position than a person who is in fact indicted. Nevertheless, the lack of a public forum 
in which to seek an acquittal in some ways puts the person in the former position at a 
disadvantage in repairing their reputation. It is for this reason that prosecutorial standards 
discourage declination statements that imply guilt. See A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 
FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, 3-1.10(c). It is also why Special Counsel Mueller decided 
not to make a prosecutorial decision about whether President Trump committed obstruction 
of justice. He wrote in his report that “fairness concerns” dictated such restraint, where 
Department of Justice policy precluded him from filing criminal charges against a sitting 
President. In that situation, Mueller concluded, it would be unfair to accuse someone of a 
crime when that person would have no opportunity “for public name-clearing before an 
impartial adjudicator.” MUELLER REPORT, supra note 19, at Vol. II. 
 146 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2015). See 
generally Neal Perlman, Section 21(A) Reports: Formalizing a Functional Release Valve at 
the Securities Exchange Commission, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 887 (2014) (discussing 
history and purposes of Section 21(a) reports). These reports are available on the SEC’s 
website, see Reports of Investigations, SEC (last updated Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.sec.go
v/litigation/investreports.shtml [https://perma.cc/2CEY-UDM6]. 
 147 As former Acting U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York, Joon Kim 
observed in an interview following his departure,“Prosecutors don’t ask and we do not answer 
the questions: Is this conduct appropriate? Was this conduct ethical? Was this conduct 
something we’d like to see or condone or promote in leaders? We don’t ask and we don’t 
answer those questions as prosecutors. Prosecution is a blunt tool – you either prosecute 
someone or you don’t. And the fact that you don’t prosecute someone doesn’t mean that 
everything is hunky-dory.” Cristian Farisa, Preet Bharara’s Former Deputy on His Old Boss’s 
Firing and the Michael Cohen Case, INTELLIGENCER (Apr. 29, 2018), https://nymag.com/inte
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4. Political Risk 
Moreover, where the prosecutor’s reason for declining charges is based 
on factors such as the allocation of resources, prior practice, or the exercise 
of mercy, greater transparency may undermine prosecutors’ ability to 
perform another important aspect of their role—mitigating “the rigors of the 
penal system.”148  As David Sklansky explains, prosecutors’ discretion in 
charging allows the system “to fudge on its commitments”149 by “blunting 
the edges”150 of overly harsh or broad laws.  That is, prosecutors exercise 
their negative discretion so that society need not bear the costs—both 
economic and social—of a regime of full enforcement.  Our criminal justice 
system relies on prosecutors to play this mitigating function.  But 
traditionally, that function has been exercised in private.  Too much 
transparency can provide “levers for less engaged, and perhaps overly 
punitive, actors to intervene in downstream decision-making.”151  For 
example, politicians could pass more punitive laws or strip funding or 
authority from prosecutors whom they perceive as too lenient.  Individuals 
aggrieved by the prosecutor’s decision could seek to bring public pressure to 
bear on prosecutors to change course.152  Thus, the risks to prosecutors’ 
 
lligencer/2018/04/joon-kim-on-following-preet-and-the-michael-cohen-case.html [https://per
ma.cc/X5HF-QPKE] (emphasis in original). 
 148 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004). 
 149 See Bowers, supra note 1, at 1662–63 (explaining that the notion that prosecutors 
should rigidly apply the criminal law “is both untenable and unattractive” and almost 
universally rejected “in case law and commentary”— rather, the prosecutor’s job in part is “to 
individualize justice,” through the “exercise discretion and common sense”); see also 
Sklansky, supra note 4, at 506. 
 150 Sklansky, supra note 4, at 506. 
 151 See Richman, supra note 14, at 70. 
 152 For example, United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania William 
McSwain issued a public statement in 2019 fiercely criticizing progressive District Attorney 
Larry Krasner and calling for accountability for Krasner’s lack of “robust enforcement” of the 
criminal law. McSwain accused Krasner of “promoting “a new culture of disrespect for law 
enforcement,” saying “we don’t have . . . robust enforcement by the District Attorney. 
Instead . . . we have diversionary programs for gun offenses, the routine downgrading of 
charges for violent crime, and entire sections of the criminal code that are being ignored . . . It 
is now time for the District Attorney and his enablers to stop making excuses for criminals.” 
Statement by United States Attorney William M. McSwain on the Shooting of Six 
Philadelphia Police Officers (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edpa/pr/statemen
t-united-states-attorney-william-m-mcswain-shooting-six-philadelphia-police [https://perma.
cc/S9TS-RXWN]. 
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beneficial mediating role153 must be factored into any overall assessment of 
the benefits of greater public reason-giving by prosecutors. 
There also is a risk that greater transparency about the reasons for 
declinations may be a one-way ratchet and will increase expectations that 
prosecutors will provide such disclosure in the ordinary course.  Succumbing 
to that pressure in cases where prosecutors are concerned about revealing 
their true reasons for declination, perhaps for fear of political reprisal, 
increases the risk that prosecutors will give insincere reasons—which would 
undermine most interests served by declination statements.154  On the other 
hand, refusing to provide reasons in such cases may be met with frustration 
and distrust, all the more so if detailed statements become more common. 
5. Drain on Prosecutorial Resources 
Finally, there is a risk that the more time prosecutors spend on 
declination statements, the less time they will spend on their other 
responsibilities, including investigating and prosecuting crime.  After all, 
prosecutorial resources are finite.  So, it is reasonable to ask whether the 
benefits of prosecutorial declinations outweigh the burdens they necessarily 
impose on the day-to-day administration of prosecutorial offices and their 
overall efficiency.155 
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE REGARDING DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
Currently, prosecutors must navigate the benefits and risks of 
declination statements without significant guidance.  Academic literature has 
largely overlooked this aspect of the prosecutorial role, as have most national 
professional rules and standards.  This Part analyzes these various sources.  
First, it discusses the academic literature.  Second, it turns to the model rules 
 
 153 See Barkow, supra note 134, at 1158 (noting that, given the politics of criminal justice, 
greater transparency in charging criteria and priorities might cause agencies to adopt policies 
that are harsher than they otherwise would); see also Sklansky, supra note 4, at 40; Ronald 
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409 
(2003); Wright & Miller, supra note 6. 
 154 See supra Part I(B). Insincerity does not entirely vitiate declination statements’ value, 
however. As Glen Staszewski has observed, “it would be preferable if public citizens regularly 
provided genuine reasons for their positions, but insincerity does not eliminate our ability to 
evaluate the merits of their choices or the explanations that they have provided to justify them. 
On the contrary, insincere explanations are more likely to be vulnerable to criticism.” 
Staszewski, supra note 77, at 1289. 
 155 Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30, at 1277 (noting that imposing a requirement on prosecutors 
that they explain all of their declinations “has the potential to be overly burdensome and 
unworkable,” and that it would not be advisable to impose such a requirement as it would 
“impede [prosecutors’] ability to prosecute the many cases they choose to pursue”). 
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of professional conduct, federal guidelines, and national standards like those 
issued by the American Bar Association’s Criminal Justice Section and the 
National Association of District Attorneys.  Having exposed the lack of 
guidance available to prosecutors from these sources, this Part then surveys 
prosecutors’ individual policies and practices regarding declination 
statements, based upon outreach to some of the nation’s largest prosecutorial 
offices.  Finally, this Part offers a typography of declination statements 
varying along two axes.  The final section of this Article, Part III, will use 
the typography in providing guidance to prosecutors going forward. 
A. ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
Although the literature about prosecutorial discretion is vast, only a 
relatively small portion of it has been devoted to prosecutors’ decisions not 
to charge.  And none of it has focused on how prosecutors should convey 
their declination decisions to various audiences.  Thus, for example, some 
scholars have written about prosecutors’ duty not to decline cases involving 
certain kinds of crimes, such as domestic violence or police misconduct, even 
where convictions may be difficult.156  Others have explored the legitimacy 
of prosecutors’ authority to decline prosecution in the face of sufficient 
evidence,157 or challenged our criminal justice system’s entrustment of such 
decisions to prosecutors as opposed to some other actor.158  Much of the 
seminal prior work on declinations has been empirical in nature, aimed at 
discerning how often prosecutors decline to prosecute, in what kinds of cases, 
and for what reasons.  Thus, for example, for their 2008 article, The Black 
Box, Marc Miller and Ron Wright examined data compiled by prosecutors in 
four cities to determine what constraints, if any, appeared to guide 
prosecutors’ exercise of discretion not to charge.159  Other scholars have 
analyzed federal prosecutors’ declination decisions to discern patterns and 
trends.160  All of this prior work supports one of the principal claims of this 
 
 156 See, e.g., Tamara Rice Lave, The Prosecutor’s Duty to ‘Imperfect’ Rape Victims, 49 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 219 (2016); Rebecca Roiphe, The Duty to Charge in Police Use of 
Excessive Force Cases, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 503 (2017). 
 157 See, e.g., Fairfax, Jr., supra note 30. 
 158 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of 
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1362–65 (2008); Bowers, supra note 1. 
 159 See Miller & Wright, supra note 10. The authors determined that declinations in fact 
revealed “an internal legal order at work,” reflecting internal office policies and social norms 
and the “influence of substantive and procedural legal doctrines.” Id. at 130–31; see also 
Bowers, supra note 1 (analyzing declination data for New York and Iowa). 
 160 Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980); see, e.g., Michael Edmund 
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Article, namely that keeping records of prosecutors’ declination decisions is 
critical to holding prosecutors accountable—precisely so that, at a minimum, 
future researchers can analyze these records and report their findings. But the 
prior literature does not fully explore the other interests (beyond 
prosecutorial accountability) that information about declinations can 
serve.161  Nor does it consider public statements about declinations on a case-
by-case basis, the particular risks associated with such statements, and when, 
if ever, such statements may be warranted. 
B. PROFESSIONAL GUIDANCE 
1. Model Rules 
The rules governing lawyers and most professional standards do not 
adequately address declination statements.  For example, although most 
states have adopted a rule of professional conduct on trial publicity analogous 
to the ABA’s Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6,162 that rule addresses 
statements made in the context of pending trials or other adjudicative 
proceedings—not those made where no charges are filed.  Similarly, Model 
Rule 3.8(f), which fewer states have adopted, cautions prosecutors to refrain 
from making public statements “that have a substantial likelihood of 
heightening public condemnation of an accused.”163  But by using the term 
“accused,” the Rule implicitly restricts its scope to contexts in which charges 
have been filed.  The Rule also allows for statements “necessary to inform 
the public of the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action,” and to “serve 
a legitimate law enforcement purpose,”164 without providing guidance as to 
how prosecutors might balance those interests against the mandate to protect 
an accused or target from unnecessary condemnation. 
 
O’Neill, When Prosecutors Don’t: Trends in Federal Prosecutorial Declinations, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 221 (2003). 
 161 Miller and Wright recognize some of the other interests that information about 
declinations can serve, such as illuminating the norms or priorities of particular prosecutorial 
offices and prompting changes in police practices or legal rules. See Miller & Wright, supra 
note 10, at 165–66, 196. The present Article builds on Wright and Miller’s important work 
and also identifies other interests served by declination statements. 
 162 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3.6 (2015) (providing that a lawyer who is 
participating in a matter “shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or 
reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will 
have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 
matter”). 
 163 Id. at § 3.8(f). 
 164 Id. 
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2. Federal Guidelines 
At the federal level, the Justice Manual (JM) provides instruction for 
United States Attorneys on some limited issues related to declination 
statements.  For example, it provides that all declinations handled by the 
Fraud Section’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) Unit will be public,165 
although it does not discuss the content or form of such declinations.166  For 
other types of criminal cases, the guidance is even less clear.  This absence 
is particularly striking given that federal criminal prosecution is even more 
discretionary than state prosecution.167  This is especially so because there is 
almost always overlapping state jurisdiction for any potential crime 
investigated by federal authorities, whereas the converse is not true.168  The 
JM directs federal prosecutors to document in their files declinations for 
cases referred directly by an agency169 and provides that a United States 
Attorney has the discretion to privately notify an individual previously 
deemed a target than his or her target status had ended.170  But it does not 
 
 165 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12,  at § 9-47.120 (“Declinations awarded under 
the FCPA Corporate Enforcement Policy will be made public.”). The DOJ Antitrust Division 
has made public a model “leniency letter.” See ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
MODEL LENIENCY LETTER, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/05/13/
239524.pdf [https://perma.cc/6NLA-4JDE] [hereinafter DOJ, MODEL LENIENCY LETTER]. 
 166 The Unit’s website has links to approximately 10 declination letters written between 
2016 and 2018, all of which are one to three pages long and are written to counsel for the 
companies that received the declinations. Each of the letters sets forth a brief summary of the 
Department’s factual findings and then explains the decision to close the case without charges, 
tracking the factors set forth in the Unit’s Pilot Program (announced in April 2016) such as 
the company’s efforts consistent with them, such as prompt voluntary self-disclosure, fulsome 
cooperation with the Government including identification of individual wrongdoers, improved 
compliance programs, and remediation. Some appear to be more like deferred or non-
prosecution agreements, in that they also contain signatures by defense counsel and an 
agreement to take certain additional actions. 
 167 See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and 
Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 765 (1999). 
 168 See Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 682 (2014) (“[B]ecause states continue to hold primary law enforcement responsibility 
within our federal system, federal prosecutors often can ignore the offense altogether, thus 
leaving the decision whether to prosecute with state officials.”); Kate Stith, The Arc of the 
Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 Yale L.J. 1420, 1423 
(2008) (noting that “most conduct that violates federal law also violates state law”). 
 169 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-2.020. 
 170 See id. at § 9-11.155 (providing that a prosecutor may notify “an individual, who has 
been the target of a grand jury investigation, that the individual is no longer considered to be 
a target.”). The policy provides some guidance about when such notification may be 
appropriate, such as when the target previously had been notified that he or she was a target; 
when the relevant investigation has been discontinued without an indictment against the target; 
 
2020] PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS 523 
address when such statements should be released to the public, or other 
means of communicating the declination decision more broadly171—the 
hardest questions to confront.  Although the JM may be interpreted as 
presumptively directing prosecutors not to publicly disclose that a particular 
individual or entity was under investigation when no charges are filed (in 
non-FCPA cases), it also suggests that there may be circumstances in which 
an overriding interest would warrant such disclosure; but this suggestion 
comes without any discussion of what those circumstances might be.172 
The most comprehensive policy on declination statements in a publicly 
available document issued by the DOJ can be found in the Antitrust 
Division’s “Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of 
Investigations.”173  Pursuant to that policy, which is not incorporated into the 
JM, the Division will consider issuing a public statement about the closing 
of a matter without initiating an enforcement action when the DOJ previously 
had publicly confirmed the investigation174 and when the matter was the 
 
or when the evidence conclusively establishes that the individual’s target status had ended. Id. 
The policy further provides that a United States Attorney may decline to provide such 
notification for any “appropriate” reason, including, for example, a potential negative impact 
on “the integrity of the investigation or the grand jury process;” and that the United States 
Attorney needed not provide any explanation for declining such a request. Id. Moreover, if the 
United States Attorney decides to make the notification to the former target, “the language of 
the notification may be tailored to the particular case,” and “may be drafted to preclude the 
target from using the notification as a ‘clean bill of health’ or testimonial.” Id. Finally, the 
delivery of such a notification to a target or the target’s attorney does not preclude the United 
States Attorney or Grand Jury from reinstituting the investigation without notification to the 
target if the circumstances warrant such action. Id. 
 171 Only when charges are withdrawn after already having been filed does the Manual 
address the notion of a public explanation, recommending that prosecutors explain in a court 
filing the reasons for the dismissal when the case is “of considerable public interest or 
importance.” DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at § 9-2.050. Then, the Justice Manual 
counsels that “a written motion for leave to dismiss should be filed explaining fully the reason 
for the request,” and that “the importance of the case is not to be measured simply by the 
punishment prescribed for the offense.” Id. 
 172 See DOJ, JUSTICE MANUAL, supra note 12, at §§ 1-7.100–7.400 (providing a 
presumption that “non-public, sensitive information obtained in connection with work” may 
not be disclosed outside of DOJ “other than as necessary to fulfill DOJ official duties” and 
citing unfair “damage to the reputation of a person” as one of the reasons for the policy). The 
exception noted is for when the public needs to be reassured that “the appropriate law 
enforcement agency is investigating a matter, or where release of information is necessary to 
protect the public safety.” Id. This public safety exception is typically cited as justification for 
an announcement that a suspect is at large and is considered an ongoing threat, even though 
the investigation is ongoing. 
 173 See Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of Investigations, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (last updated June 25, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/atr/issuance-public-statements-
upon-closing-investigations [https://perma.cc/JA2M-YG8N]. 
 174 Id. 
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subject of “substantial publicity.”175  The more publicity the matter received, 
“the more likely it is that the Division will issue a statement.”176  In deciding 
whether to issue a statement, the Division “will evaluate the value to the 
public in receiving information regarding the reasons for non-enforcement 
(including public trust in the Department’s enforcement, and the value of the 
analysis for other enforcers, businesses and consumers).”177  As for the 
content of the statement, the guidance provides that “[n]o confidential or 
privileged information will be disclosed, including information regarding 
internal deliberations or confidential investigative techniques.”178  Also, no 
other “non-public evidence or information will be disclosed that is protected 
by law” and “[n]o disparaging characterizations of individuals or 
organizations will be included in the statement.”179  The policy also provides 
that any “parties to the investigation” will be given prior notice that a 
statement will be released, and that the statement “will include a disclaimer” 
making clear that “enforcement decisions are made on a case by case basis 
and that the analysis and conclusions discussed in the statement are not 
binding on the Department in future matters.”180 
The DOJ Antitrust Division’s guidance is remarkable for its relative 
level of detail—but also for its limited reach.  Federal criminal law 
enforcement constitutes a narrow slice of the overall criminal justice picture 
in the United States,181 and criminal antitrust cases represent a tiny fraction 
of that narrow slice.182  While it is true that “antitrust analysis is complex”183 
and has potential national and international economic effects—reasons cited 
in the Antitrust Division’s policy preamble for issuing statements in this 
area—there are many other areas of federal criminal law that are complex, or 
where considerable public benefits would accrue from transparency in 
 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
 181 As one measure of the relative footprint of the federal criminal justice system relative 
to that of the states, at the end of 2017, federal prisoners represented 12% of the total of the 
U.S. prison population, whereas individuals serving state prison sentences accounted for 88% 
of the total. See JENNIFER BRONSON & ANN CARSON, U.S. DEPT’ OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2017 at 3 (Apr. 2019). 
 182 Compare Criminal Enforcement Trends Charts, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (last updated 
Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/atr/criminal-enforcement-fine-and-jail-charts [https:
//perma.cc/W6CR-2G83] (stating that twenty-four criminal antitrust cases were filed in 2017), 
with U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 
2017 (2017) (stating that 53,899 criminal cases were filed in fiscal year 2017). 
 183 See Issuance of Public Statements Upon Closing of Investigations, supra note 173. 
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declination decisions.  Moreover, it is telling that all of the closing statements 
posted on the DOJ Antitrust Division’s website pursuant to this guidance 
(approximately one to four per year since 2003) appear to be issued by the 
civil enforcement arm of the Antitrust Division, rather than its criminal 
unit.184 
The controversy over then-FBI Director James Comey’s July 2016 press 
conference regarding the closure of the Hillary Clinton investigation 
confirms the absence of generally applicable guidance for federal declination 
statements.  As he recounted in his 2018 memoir, despite his decades of 
experience as a federal prosecutor, including as United States Attorney for 
the Southern District of New York and Deputy Attorney General at the DOJ, 
the FBI Director was uncertain as to what kind of public statement was 
permissible once the investigation was over.185  Both current and former DOJ 
 
 184 The criminal unit maintains a separate “leniency program” whereby individuals and 
corporations who have violated the criminal antitrust laws can avoid prosecution if they self-
report and provide assistance in the prosecution of others. Corporations can only obtain 
leniency if they are “first in the door” for a particular antitrust conspiracy. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ANTITRUST DIVISION’S LENIENCY PROGRAM AND 
MODEL LENIENCY LETTERS (Jan. 26, 2017) [hereinafter LENIENCY FAQ]. If the Department of 
Justice approves a candidate for leniency pursuant to the program, it will issue a leniency letter 
confirming that fact and setting forth its terms. Although the Antitrust Division has published 
model leniency letters on its website, see DOJ, MODEL LENIENCY LETTER, supra note 165, it 
does not make publicly available individual leniency letters since it treats the recipients as 
confidential informants. See LENIENCY FAQ at 28. These kinds of leniency arrangements are 
more akin to traditional cooperation agreements than declinations. 
 185 Comey wrote in his 2018 memoir that when the end was in sight of one of the most 
high-profile and consequential investigations in modern memory, he asked his staff to research 
“any policy or other limitations around making such a statement; and the wisdom and 
mechanics of presenting it,” including whether the statement should be made standing next to 
the Attorney General, or take the form of a written report to Congress. JAMES COMEY, A 
HIGHER LOYALTY 175 (2018). That decision was rendered even more complex by the fact that 
the Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, had announced that she would defer to the 
recommendation of the FBI and the career prosecutors on the case, in light of concerns about 
the appearance of a conflict of interest presented by Lynch’s status as a political appointee and 
her private meeting on a plane with former President Bill Clinton in June 2016. See Mark 
Landler et al., Loretta Lynch to Accept F.B.I. Recommendations in Clinton Email Inquiry, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/02/us/politics/loretta-lynch-
hillary-clinton-email-server.html [https://perma.cc/R2UF-UCDL]. Lynch’s top deputies at the 
Department of Justice similarly had announced they would defer to the FBI and the career 
prosecutors’ recommendation. Comey ultimately held a press conference without any other 
DOJ officials present on July 5, 2016, at which he announced that the FBI was recommending 
that no charges be filed. In his prepared statement and at the press conference, Comey 
characterized Secretary Clinton’s handling of her email containing classified information as 
“extremely careless.” See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director James Comey 
Recommends No Charges for Hillary Clinton on Email, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), https://w
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officials roundly criticized Comey’s chosen course of action—i.e., a press 
conference at which he characterized Clinton’s conduct as “extremely 
careless” but opined that no reasonable prosecutor would bring criminal 
charges for her mishandling of classified information.186  However, his critics 
overwhelmingly cited the “norms” and “traditions” of the DOJ, rather than 
explicit rules or policy statements, as the basis for their objections.187  
 
ww.nytimes.com/2016/07/06/us/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-email-comey.html [https://perma.
cc/M3C3-UFQ3]. On July 6, 2016, Attorney General Loretta Lynch announced that she was 
accepting that recommendation. See Michael D. Shear, Attorney General Accepts 
Recommendation Not to Charge Hillary Clinton, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2016), https://www.nyti
mes.com/2016/07/07/us/politics/hillary-clinton-loretta-lynch.html [https://perma.cc/M523-9
TV8]. On July 7, 2016, Comey testified before the House Oversight and Government Reform 
Committee, providing more detail about his decision. After his testimony, lawmakers 
requested access to the FBI Report. See Sarah Westwood, FBI to Congress: File FOIA Request 
for Clinton Email Files, WASHINGTON EXAM’R (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonexa
miner.com/fbi-to-congress-file-foia-request-for-clinton-email-files [https://perma.cc/WQ3A-
DSH4]. On September 2, 2016, in response to numerous FOIA requests, the FBI released its 
(redacted) report on the Clinton investigation, which contained summaries of witness 
interviews and emails provided by the State Department. See FBI Releases Documents in 
Hillary Clinton E-Mail Investigation, FBI (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel
/press-releases/fbi-releases-documents-in-hillary-clinton-e-mail-investigation [https://perma.
cc/K2AQ-ZT68]; see also Tal Kopan & Evan Perez, FBI Releases Hillary Clinton Email 
Report, CNN (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/02/politics/hillary-clinton-fbi-in
terview-notes/index.html [https://perma.cc/S69L-UJLK]; FBI, FBI: THE VAULT, CLINTON E-
MAIL INVESTIGATION (July 2016), https://vault.fbi.gov/hillary-r.-clinton/Hillary%20R.%20Cli
nton%20Part%2001%20of%2027/view [https://perma.cc/5V5T-D7L3]. On September 23, 
2016, the FBI released 200 pages of notes from its investigation. On October 28, 2016, Comey 
sent a letter to congress revealing that the FBI was reviewing new emails related to the 
investigation found in the course of an unrelated investigation; and on November 6, 2016 sent 
another letter to lawmakers informing them that the agency had not changed its opinion. The 
Department of Justice Inspector General later issued its own report about the FBI’s handling 
of the Clinton email investigation. See infra notes 188–89. 
 186 See supra note 185. 
 187 See, e.g., Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., for the Att’y Gen. 
(May 9, 2017) (on file with Journal and author) (memorandum by the Deputy Attorney 
General initially cited by President Trump in support of his decision to fire Comey, repeatedly 
citing “traditions” and “principles” of the FBI and the Department of Justice, rather than law 
or policy, that the FBI director transgressed); Jamie Gorelick & Larry Thompson, James 
Comey is Damaging Our Democracy, WASH. POST  (Oct. 29, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/opinions/james-comey-is-damaging-our-democracy/2016/10/29/894d0f5e-9e49-11
e6-a0ed-ab0774c1eaa5_story.html [https://perma.cc/KG3A-PXMM] (op-ed by two former 
Deputy Attorneys General citing “long standing and well-established traditions limiting 
disclosure of ongoing investigations to the public and even to Congress”). To be sure, much 
of the criticism of Comey focused on two additional issues. The first was the fact that he 
bypassed the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney General to make the announcement 
himself, despite DOJ policy requiring approval of high-level Department of Justice officials 
for public statements—even though the Attorney General and her deputy had announced that 
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Additionally, the DOJ Inspector General who reviewed the FBI’s handling 
of the Clinton investigation concluded that Comey’s public announcement 
“clearly and dramatically” departed from FBI and DOJ norms.188  The 
Inspector General recommended that, going forward, the DOJ and the FBI 
consider adopting a policy about employees “discussing the conduct of 
uncharged individuals in public statements,” 189 in effect acknowledging that 
no such policy existed at the time. 
3. National Standards 
National standards issued by professional associations like the 
American Bar Association are not particularly helpful in this area, either.  For 
example, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on the Prosecutorial 
Function offer an incomplete discussion of declination statements.  They 
provide that a “prosecutor may make a public statement explaining why 
criminal charges have been declined or dismissed, but must take care not to 
imply guilt or otherwise prejudice the interests of victims, witnesses or 
subjects of an investigation.”190  Missing are more detailed criteria for 
deciding when a public statement is warranted, what factors to weigh when 
considering issuing such a statement, and how best to avoid implying guilt 
or otherwise causing prejudice.  Nor do the Prosecution Function Standards 
address other options available to prosecutors to accomplish these ends. 
Another set of standards, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards on Fair 
Trial and Public Discourse, provides more fulsome guidance.  The Fair Trial 
Standards counsel that prosecutors and other lawyers participating in 
criminal matters should not make public statements that have a substantial 
likelihood of “unnecessarily heightening public condemnation”—not just of 
an accused, but of any individual “publicly identified in the context of a 
 
they would accept the recommendation of the FBI and the career prosecutors. See supra note 
185. The second issue was the proximity of the announcement to the upcoming Presidential 
election, which critics contended ignored a long-standing DOJ memorandum about actions 
close to an election, despite the fact that the memo applied only to investigations of election-
related crimes. See ERIC HOLDER, ATTORNEY GEN. MEMORANDUM TO ALL DEPARTMENT 
EMPLOYEES, ELECTION YEAR SENSITIVITIES (Mar. 9, 2012). In any event, none of the criticism 
cited any clear policy that Comey’s statements violated had he been the prosecutor in this 
situation and had there been no election year sensitivities. 
 188 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY 
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 
2016 ELECTION 497 (June 2018). 
 189 Id. 
 190 See A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, 3-
1.10(c). 
528 ROTH [Vol. 110 
criminal investigation.”191  The Fair Trial Standards then identify subject 
areas that pose a particularly high risk, such as statements conveying a 
prosecutor’s personal opinion about an individual’s guilt, innocence, 
reputation, or character—or statements about the credibility of witnesses, 
including victims.192  However, these Standards also state that “a transparent 
and open criminal justice system is of critical importance in our democracy,” 
and that those involved in that system “have a duty to promote respect for 
and confidence in the criminal justice system,” as well as to ensure that 
criminal cases are conducted fairly.193  To that end, they recognize that a 
prosecutor may make public statements “necessary to inform the public of 
the nature and extent of the prosecutor’s action,” including “the existence of 
an investigation in progress” and its general length and scope.194  Thus, the 
Fair Trial Standards are more detailed than those on the Prosecution Function 
generally, but still do not fully address when the interests in transparency and 
confidence in the criminal justice system warrant release of a declination 
statement. 
The National District Attorney Association (NDAA) Standards, which 
are a general resource for state prosecutors, are similarly incomplete in 
addressing declination statements.  They provide that “[w]here permitted by 
law, a prosecutor’s office should retain a record of the reasons for declining 
a prosecution,” and that “[t]he prosecutor should promptly respond to 
inquiries from those who are directly affected by a declination of charges.”195  
But they do not address how declination reasons should be recorded, who is 
sufficiently “affected” by a declination decision to warrant a response, or 
how those responses should be provided and what they should include.  
However, they do counsel that victims of particularly serious crimes should 
be notified, when feasible, of the rejection of a case by the prosecutor.196  
Like the DOJ’s Justice Manual, the NDAA Standards suggest that 
prosecutors inform individuals who previously had been notified that they 
 
 191 A.B.A., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 8-
2.1(a)(ii) (4th ed. 2013). 
 192 Id. at 8-2.2(a). 
 193 Id. at 8-1.1(b). 
 194 Id. at 8-2.2(b). 
 195 NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEY’S ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 4-1.7, 4-1.8 
(3d. 2009). 
 196 See id. at 2-9.1. 
2020] PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS 529 
were targets of a grand jury that the investigation is over, but they do not 
address questions about public release of information about declinations.197 
C. POLICY AND PRACTICE 
1. Office Policies 
In the absence of guidance from national organizations about 
declination statements, most prosecutors’ offices are navigating this difficult 
terrain on their own, with different levels of intentionality.  Inquiries to some 
of the largest state prosecutors’ offices in the country revealed only a handful 
of policies addressing declination statements,198 the vast majority of which 
addressed only certain categories of cases (most commonly, police 
shootings).199  For example, the New Jersey Office of the Attorney General 
 
 197 Id. at Standard 3-3.8., Termination of Target Status (“If a person has previously been 
notified or made aware that he or she was the target of a grand jury investigation and the 
prosecutor elects not to seek an indictment or the grand jury fails to return a true bill and no 
further investigation against the target is contemplated, the prosecutor should notify the person 
he or she is no longer a target, unless doing so is inconsistent with the effective enforcement 
of the criminal law.”). 
 198 In connection with this Article, we reached out to the 102 largest prosecutorial offices 
in the United States, as measured by number of full-time prosecutors employed. Thirty-six 
responded. Out of those thirty-six, most stated that, to the extent they had a policy, it was 
unwritten and informal, although most contemplated that there were circumstances in which 
public statements were appropriate. Among the factors cited were the type of case, the level 
of media attention or public inquiry, or whether the accused was a police officer. Only one of 
the offices stated that their policy was not to issue a statement about declinations in any kind 
of case. Response from the Dep’t of the Prosecuting Attorney of Honolulu, Nov. 28, 2018, 
citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 846-1, 846-9 (2012). Fifteen of the thirty-six offices that responded 
to inquiries for this Article stated that they do not have a policy regarding, or decide on a case-
by-case basis, whether to issue a declination statement at all, and what to include in it. Inquiries 
to state District Attorney Organizations similarly pointed to an absence of policies on 
declination statements. Of the twenty-two such organizations that responded to our inquiries, 
all stated that they did not issue such policies to their members, even on a recommended basis, 
and were unaware of the existence of such policies at member offices. Offices in Florida and 
Massachusetts cited state laws requiring them to file documents with the clerk of court 
whenever they declined to prosecute cases initiated by police. These documents, known 
variously as “No Informations” or “No Prosecutions” are typically very brief and provide a 
one-sentence explanation for the decision, such as the defendant’s completion of a diversion 
program or insufficient evidence to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt. These 
documents are available pursuant to the states’ open records laws, but inquirers must be able 
to provide the docket number or defendant’s name. See FLA. STAT. § 119.021; MASS. GEN. 
LAWS 4 § 7(26). 
 199 In response to our inquiries, twelve offices responded that it was their policy to make 
a public statement about the declination of charges against a police officer, regardless of 
whether they had such a policy for other types of cases. Two of those offices responded that 
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has authority over all criminal justice matters in the state, but has only 
promulgated a policy regarding public statements when charges are not filed 
for police use of force cases.200  It requires that the county prosecutor or the 
Department of Criminal Justice “issue a public statement setting forth 
findings of the investigation and findings regarding justification for use of 
force” any time a case is not presented to a grand jury or the grand jury 
declines to indict.201  Similarly, the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City has 
adopted a policy of posting case summaries on its website explaining the 
legal and factual rationale for all declinations in cases involving police use 
of force.202 
In contrast, the Ventura County District Attorney’s Office in California 
has issued a more broadly applicable policy about declination statements.  It 
provides that a written “news release” may be appropriate to announce the 
rejection of charges “in a murder or other high-profile case;”203 “the 
conclusion of an investigation regarding an officer-involved shooting, in 
custody, death, use of force, or other official misconduct;”204 where charges 
were rejected against “a peace office or public official for felony conduct, 
moral turpitude offense, or offense related to the performance of official 
duties;”205 and where “the identity of the participants and nature of the 
information is such that the case already has been covered by the news media, 
 
they will only make a declination statement in cases involving police. In Colorado, District 
Attorneys are required by state law to make a public statement for officer-involved shootings. 
See COLO. REV. STAT. § 20-1-114. One progressive prosecutor organization, the Association 
of Prosecuting Attorneys, recommends that prosecutors provide transparency in all cases 
where they decline to charge an officer in cases involving police use of force. See ASS’N OF 




 200 See DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, N.J. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., UNIFORM STATEWIDE 
PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATING AND REVIEWING POLICE USE-OF-FORCE 
INCIDENTS 12 (Post-Closure Public Statement). 
 201 Id. 
 202 See Office of the State’s Attorney for Baltimore City, Police Use of Force Declination 
Reports, https://www.stattorney.org/policy-legislative-affairs/policy/police-use-of-force-decl
ination-reports [https://perma.cc/D3YA-MVV5]. The Baltimore office did not respond to our 
inquiries, but this policy is available on its website. The website notes that the Office is the 
only one in Maryland that follows recommendation of the Association of Prosecuting 
Attorney’s (APA) 21st Century Prosecution Standards to communicate directly with the 
public when declining to charge an officer-involved shooting. Id. 
 203 See VENTURA CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, supra note 48, at 72–73. 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. 
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or inquiries by news media are likely.”206  The policy instructs prosecutors to 
inform investigating agents of the factual and legal reasons for rejecting 
charges to keep them “current with the law as well as to assist them in 
improving future investigation.”207  However, it does not address whether 
news releases should include the reasons for the declination, even in the 
enumerated categories of cases in which the policy recognizes a release may 
be appropriate.  In King County, Washington, longtime State’s Attorney Dan 
Satterberg has published an extensive policy manual; prosecutors are 
instructed to notify victims and police agencies of declinations,208 but the 
policy does not specify what form those notifications should take or their 
content.  Nor does it address public statements such as those made at a press 
conference. 
2. Typology of Declination Statements in Practice 
So, what do declination statements look like in practice?  Not 
surprisingly, they vary considerably across multiple dimensions.  If 
declination statements were plotted along one axis (the x-axis) by their 
content, they would range from the sparsest of statements to the most detailed 
(e.g. reviewing the facts and pertinent law and explaining the prosecutor’s 
decision).  They also could be plotted along another axis (the y-axis) 
according to their intended audience, with statements composed solely for 
internal consumption at one end and those intended for a public audience at 














 206 Id. 
 207 Id. at 158. 
 208 See KING CTY. PROSECUTING ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, FILING AND DISPOSITION 
STANDARDS 7, 13 (May 2016). Upon notification, victims are provided with an opportunity to 
appeal the declination decision within the prosecutor’s office. Id. 
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a. Private, Sparse 
Declination statements in the bottom left quadrant (private, sparse) 
include records kept in prosecutors’ offices reflecting the decision not to 
charge, but without supporting details.  Such records might be as limited as 
a statement that no charges were brought, full stop, along with some 
identifying information about the case type, target, and any victims. 
b. Private, Detailed 
Moving further to the right on the x-axis, statements in the bottom right 
quadrant (private, detailed) include declination statements intended primarily 
for the prosecutor’s files, but that provide the basis for the decision.  In some 
cases, the explanation may be minimal—perhaps captured by the prosecutor 
marking the applicable reasons on a checklist.209  However, in more complex 
cases, the explanation could be quite lengthy.  For example, in a case 
involving a fatal shooting by agents of the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. 
Capitol Police, federal prosecutors prepared a ninety-six-page memorandum 
recommending against prosecution.210 
Also in this quadrant (slightly further up the y-axis) are statements 
intended for limited audiences external to the prosecutor’s office, such as the 
targets of an investigation,211 victims, or referring agencies.212  Such 
statements may later become public by virtue of open records laws or 
disclosure by the recipients, and may be crafted with that possibility in mind.  
Examples of such statements include the DOJ’s letter to congressional 
 
 209 See, e.g., Miller & Wright, supra note 10 (discussing practices in New Orleans District 
Attorney’s office from 1988 to 1989, which required prosecutors to indicate the most 
applicable reason for declining to bring charges from a list of possible reasons); see also 
KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6 (noting how prosecutors in New York County are 
required to indicate their rationale for declining or dismissing a case from pre-determined set 
of reasons). 
 210 The description of the memorandum’s length and ultimate recommendation comes 
from a federal district court opinion, in which the court reviewed the memorandum in camera 
and held that it was exempt from release under FOIA. See Worldnetdaily.Com, Inc. v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp.3d 381 (D.D.C. 2016). 
 211 See, e.g., James C. McKinley, Jr., No Charges for Governor After Inquiry Into 
Contract, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/28/us/politics/28ri
chardson.html [https://perma.cc/Y653-697U] (describing letter sent to counsel for former 
New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, announcing that no charges would filed following 
inquiry into how a lucrative state contract was awarded to a political donor). 
 212 See, e.g., Memorandum to Grant County Sheriff from Jim Carpenter, Grand County 
District Attorney’s Office (Jan. 29, 2015), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/28523
71-KOITZSCH-DA-Dismissal.html [https://perma.cc/JV3V-SRVJ] (explaining decision not 
to charge identified individual). 
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committees regarding particular practices at the IRS,213 and Manhattan 
District Attorney Vance’s letter to the New York Board of Elections 
following the referral of Mayor de Blasio’s fundraising activity.214  The 
Mueller Report also falls into this category.  Pursuant to the regulations 
governing the Special Counsel’s appointment, the Special Counsel was 
required to write a report explaining his prosecution and declination 
decisions.215  Although the regulations make clear that the report was to be 
submitted initially in confidence to the Attorney General for review,216 they 
also contemplate that the report would be shared (at least in part) with 
Congress and the public.217 
c. Public, Sparse 
Declination statements in the top left quadrant (i.e. public, sparse) are 
most commonly found in cases involving public officials or high-profile 
targets, whether individuals or corporations.  These types of statements 
farther left on the x-axis typically disclose only that an investigation was 
concluded without the filing of charges,218 and generally are issued only 
where the investigation itself already was public because of the nature of the 
events under investigation or prior extensive reporting in the media.  Toward 
the middle of the x-axis are public statements that provide some details or 
reasons to support the declination, but not lengthy ones.219  In these 
declination statements, the prosecutor may cite to such reasons as insufficient 
 
 213 See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dept. of Justice, to House 
Judiciary Committee Re IRS (Oct. 23, 2015) [hereinafter Kadzik Letter] (eight-paged single-
spaced letter detailing investigative findings and application of pertinent federal criminal 
statutes). 
 214 See Vance Letter, supra note 18. 
 215 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.8 (2020) (providing that, at the conclusion of the Special 
Counsel’s work, the Special Counsel “shall provide the Attorney General with a confidential 
report explaining the prosecution or declination decisions reached”). 
 216 Id. 
 217 See 28 C.F.R. § 600.9 (2020). 
 218 See, e.g., Statement Regarding Closure of Investigation of Former Oregon Governor 
John Kitzhaber and First Lady Cylvia Hayes, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., D. OR. (June 16, 2017), http
s://www.justice.gov/usao-or/pr/statement-regarding-closure-investigation-former-oregon-go
vernor-john-kitzhaber-and-first [https://perma.cc/5CJD-6VJK] (announcing no charges 
would be filed in influence-peddling cases involving former Governor). 
 219 See, e.g., Marc Santora & James C. McKinley Jr., Sanford Rubenstein Will Not Face 
Rape Charges, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/06/nyregion/s
andy-rubenstein-will-not-face-rape-charges.html [https://perma.cc/L55S-AUVC] (quoting 
statement issued by Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s office explaining the decision not to 
file sexual assault charges against prominent lawyer Sanford Rubenstein, citing inter alia “the 
degree of the complainant’s recollection of what occurred at the suspect’s apartment, and the 
results of the toxicological testing”). 
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evidence220 or the expiration of the statute of limitations.221  Other examples 
include the availability of charges in another jurisdiction222 or the limitations 
of existing law.223 
d. Public, Detailed 
Finally, declination statements in the upper right quadrant (i.e. public, 
detailed) are statements providing more significant detail.  These are most 
commonly found in cases involving police use of force.224  This is consistent 
with the policies issued by various prosecutorial offices, discussed supra,225 
which expressly encourage or require public statements whenever 
prosecutors decline to press charges in such cases—including an explanation 
of the facts and legal rationale.  But such statements also can be found in 
other contexts, especially those involving public figures.  Serving as one 
example is FBI Director Comey’s public statement at the (initial) conclusion 
of the Hillary Clinton email investigation.  In this report, Comey summarized 
 
 220 See, e.g., No Charges to be Filed Against Officers Involved in Shooting, U.S. ATT’Y’S 
OFF., W.D. OKLA. (Aug. 18, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdok/pr/no-charges-be-
filed-against-officers-involved-shooting [https://perma.cc/NP8P-KA7U]; U.S. Attorney 
Statement Regarding Conclusion of Investigation into Incident Involving Former Asheville 
Police Officer, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., W.D.N.C. (June 29, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
wdnc/pr/us-attorney-statement-regarding-conclusion-investigation-incident-involving-forme
r [https://perma.cc/KKT7-U36G] (stating that “the evidence does not give rise to a 
prosecutable violation of the federal criminal civil rights laws”). 
 221 See supra note 50 and examples cited therein. 
 222 See, e.g., Schneider, supra note 70. 
 223 See supra notes 49–51 and examples cited therein. 
 224 See, e.g., Federal Officials Close Investigation Into Death of Alton Sterling, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUST. (May 3, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-close-investigation-
death-alton-sterling [https://perma.cc/5YQ6-5CXY] (relatively long statement that discusses 
the facts and applicable legal standard for the civil rights laws at issue, involving police 
shooting of man with BB gun); Federal Officials Close Review of Fatal Shooting of Kionte 
Spencer, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdva/pr/federal-o
fficials-close-review-fatal-shooting-kionte-spencer [https://perma.cc/RC6D-RWBK] (same); 
JACKIE LACEY, L.A. CTY. DIST. ATT’Y, OFFICER INVOLVED SHOOTING OF JUAN BARILLAS 
(2019); Federal Officials Decline Prosecution in the Death of Freddie Gray, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST. (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-officials-decline-prosecution-d
eath-freddie-gray [https://perma.cc/WLW8-VJUP] (statement with long factual summary, 
summary of applicable legal standard, and discussion of the law applied to the facts); 
KIMBERLY M. FOXX, COOK CTY. STATE’S ATT’Y, POLICE INVOLVED DEATH DECISION 
MEMORANDUM DECEDENT: PAUL O’NEAL (three-page, single-spaced report by Cook County, 
Illinois State’s Attorney Kimberly M. Foxx explaining decision not to charge officer in on-
duty shooting, summarizing applicable law and facts learned during investigation). However, 
one also finds examples in other contexts. See, e.g., Kadzik Letter, supra note 213; Vance 
Letter, supra note 18. 
 225 See supra Part II(C). 
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the FBI’s findings about Clinton’s actions, those of her associates, and 
employees at the State Department, and the intent of those individuals in 
using a private email server for public business.226  He also explained why, 
given those findings, it was his opinion that no reasonable prosecutor would 
bring charges for mishandling classified material.227  Another example is the 
public statement by the Connecticut State’s Attorney Frank Marco, 
explaining the decision not to press charges against Woody Allen for child 
sex abuse.  At a news conference, the prosecutor said that he had probable 
cause to prosecute Allen, but decided that it was not in the victim’s best 
interest to do so.228  He also discussed the findings from medical evaluations 
of the victim, and his own assessment of them, which led him to believe that 
his office had enough evidence to take the case to trial.229 
Such detailed statements also are more common in cases where a 
prosecutor has decided to withdraw charges after they have been filed.230  For 
example, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance filed a twenty-five-page 
document with the court when it sought to dismiss the charges against former 
World Bank Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn, explaining the Office’s 
reasons for doubting the complaining witness’s credibility and detailing the 
prosecutor’s ethical duty to proceed with a criminal prosecution only when 
personally convinced of the defendant’s guilt and that the evidence would be 
sufficient to convict.231  The DOJ’s declination letters in FCPA cases also 
arguably fall into this category, because they often include lengthy fact 
sections describing the corporate conduct that violated that FCPA statute 
(such as the payment of bribes to foreign leaders) and the reasons for the 
declination (such as prompt self-reporting, cooperation with investigating 
authorities, or remedial action).  However, these statements generally read 
more like negotiated settlements in which defense counsel played a 
significant role than the typical declination statement issued in the context of 
an individual target.232 
e. Tone 
One final aspect of declination statements merits discussion: their tone.  
Detailed statements (those falling on the right half of the diagram) can be 
 
 226 See Comey Statement, supra note 17. 
 227 Id. 
 228 See Henneberger, supra note 71. 
 229 Id. 
 230 See, e.g., Statement by Cook County, Illinois Prosecutor regarding Jussie Smollett, 
supra note 32; Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32. 
 231 See Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32, at 4. 
 232 See supra note 166 (describing FCPA letters posted on DOJ website). 
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inculpatory—i.e. they characterize the facts in a way that implies wrongdoing 
on the part of the target.  Examples of inculpatory statements include those 
by FBI Director Comey about Hillary Clinton and the State Department’s 
conduct, Manhattan District Attorney Vance’s statements about Mayor de 
Blasio’s fundraising activity, and Connecticut State’s Attorney Marco’s 
statement about Woody Allen.233  Such inculpatory statements are rare and 
seem to be most common in cases involving public officials and allegations 
of official misconduct where prosecutors may be concerned that the 
declination will otherwise send suboptimal signals (e.g. that certain conduct 
is acceptable) and will not sufficiently hold wrongdoers (if not lawbreakers) 
accountable.234  However, declination statements can also be inculpatory as 
to victims or witnesses.  For example, Manhattan District Attorney Vance 
asserted in his motion to dismiss the sexual assault charges against 
Dominique Strauss-Kahn that “the complainant’s credibility cannot 
withstand the most basic evaluation,”235 which was accompanied by 
extensive factual details to support that characterization.236  These derogatory 
statements about witnesses or victims, which are rare, seem to arise in cases 
involving high-profile targets where prosecutors anticipate accusations of 
preferential treatment. 
Each type of declination statement discussed above furthers some of the 
interests identified in Part I and also poses some risk.  The following section 
discusses how prosecutors can maximize such benefits and minimize the 
risks in various contexts. 
 
 233 See, Comey Statement, supra note 17 (characterizing Hillary Clinton’s conduct as 
“extremely careless” and opining that the “security culture of the State Department . . . was 
generally lacking in the kind of care for classified information found elsewhere in the 
government”); Vance Letter, supra note 18 (noting that, while actions “do not make out a 
provable violation of the Election Law’s criminal provisions,” they appeared to be “contrary 
to the intent and spirit of the law” and constituted “an end run around the direct candidate 
contribution limits”). 
 234 See, e.g., Statement of the United States Attorney, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF., S.D. IND. (Oct. 
22, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdin/pr/statement-united-states-attorney [https://per
ma.cc/C6D7-SY3Q] (announcing decision not to charge former elected Marion County 
prosecutor for abuse of his position, but calling the conduct “unacceptable” and announcing 
that the matter would be referred for investigation to the relevant ethics entities); McKinley, 
Jr., supra note 211 (describing letter sent to counsel for former New Mexico Governor Bill 
Richardson, announcing that no charges would filed but stating that “pressure from the 
governor’s office resulted in corruption of the procurement process” and that the letter “should 
not be interpreted as exoneration of any party’s conduct in that matter”); Kadzik Letter, supra 
note 213, at 1, 8 (describing conduct discovered as “ineffective management” and “poor 
judgment” which was “disquieting” but not a crime); Henneberger, supra note 71. 
 235 Strauss-Kahn Dismissal, supra note 32, at 2. 
 236 Id. 
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III. THE THEORY APPLIED TO PRACTICE: A SUGGESTED FRAMEWORK FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
Part III builds on the preceding sections to offer a framework to help 
prosecutors decide when and how to issue declination statements.  The 
guiding principle of the framework is that prosecutors should issue 
declination statements when they significantly further one or more of the 
interests identified in Part I, where the risks posed by such statements are 
minimized, and where their value cannot be realized through other available 
means taking into account relative institutional competencies. 
A. DEFAULT TO PRIVATE DECLINATION STATEMENTS 
The framework assumes that prosecutors at a minimum will keep some 
record of declinations internally, such that the default declination statement 
will fall in the bottom left quadrant of the diagram (private, sparse).  There 
is little to no risk associated with keeping private, sparse declination records 
other than minor administrative burdens.  And that burden is outweighed by 
the interests that such records can serve.  On an individual level, such records 
enable prosecutors to respond to inquiries (as appropriate) from targets, 
victims, and referring agencies, thus furthering significant signaling interests 
(e.g., closure and respect).  Records are particularly important if such 
inquiries arise long after the reviewing prosecutor has left the office or no 
longer remembers the case.  Taken altogether, such records also constitute 
the raw material needed to generate aggregate reports, as will be discussed 
further in Part III(D).  Particularly if they include minimal data about the 
cases that were declined (e.g. type of case, referring agency, and basic 
biographical information about the targets and victims such as race, gender, 
and age), such records also can serve significant accountability interests.  
Keeping track of these declinations can help prosecutors spot trends that 
might cause them to dig further (e.g. if they suggest under-enforcement on 
priority issues like sexual assault or police violence, or racial disparities in 
the exercise of discretion).237 
What should cause a prosecutor to move from the bottom left quadrant 
(private, sparse) to the bottom right quadrant (private, detailed) for a 
declination statement?  In an ideal world, this would be the default quadrant.  
Statements that include a narrative of the prosecutor’s decision-making—
including the facts, law, and normative considerations that informed the 
exercise of discretion—will be most useful from the perspective of internal 
 
 237 See, e.g., KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6 (analyzing dataset from New York 
County District Attorney’s Office for racial and ethnic disparity at multiple discretionary 
points, including declinations). 
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and external accountability.238  But even those that lack a narrative can 
further such interests, such as the forms that have a prosecutor choose 
rationales from a standardized list of reasons, because they also can bring to 
light patterns and trends (perhaps even more so than narratives, which may 
still require coding to be useful for this purpose).239  Such records can help 
prosecutors evaluate whether they are acting in a consistent manner across 
cases and, in any individual case, in a manner that aligns with their 
precommitments.240  More detail also helps prosecutors accurately convey to 
affected parties the rationale for the declination (if appropriate), and 
reconstruct the rationale for the decision should the prosecutor ever need to 
revisit the case (e.g. should new evidence come to light, or in the context of 
an oversight hearing). 
Because such statements remain private, the risks still are minimal; in 
fact, the most significant risk is of depleting prosecutorial resources.  Thus, 
the constraint on setting private, detailed declination statements as the default 
is largely a practical one.  That constraint might be addressed in several 
possible ways, including reducing the amount of information that prosecutors 
are required to record (e.g. by using checklists).  Alternatively, prosecutors 
might select a few case types for which they will require detailed declination 
statements, or relatively more detailed statements.  For example, prosecutors 
might choose cases involving allegations of public corruption, police 
misconduct, or domestic and sexual violence, where there have long been 
concerns about underenforcement and preferential treatment, and because 
such conduct uniquely threatens democratic ideals of equal protection of the 
law and political participation.241  Or random selection could be utilized.  
 
 238 See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text (describing how writing one’s reasons 
serves a beneficial constraining function). 
 239 See Miller & Wright, supra note 10 (analyzing precisely such data from the New 
Orleans District Attorney’s Office to identify the most common reasons for declinations in a 
variety of case types). 
 240 See, e.g., KATHERINE K. MOY ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, RATE MY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: TOWARD A SCORECARD FOR PROSECUTORS’ OFFICES 28 (2018) (citing 
models of indices developed in other public policy fields and suggesting that similar 
“prosecutorial scorecard[s] would enable sitting prosecutors to better understand where their 
offices need the most work”); David Sklansky, Unpacking the Relationship Between 
Prosecutors and Democracy in the United States, in PROSECUTORS AND DEMOCRACY, supra 
note 14. 
 241 See Darryl Brown, supra note 38 (identifying these three categories of cases as among 
those prone to under-enforcement); cf. Roiphe, supra note 156, at 505 (arguing for an 
enhanced duty to charge in cases involving “historically neglected and abused” minorities 
because such cases “implicate[] basic democratic principles of equality and fairness.”); 
Richman, supra note 14, at 55 (suggesting that prosecutors play a particularly important role 
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Even if prosecutors only write detailed declination statements in occasional 
randomly selected cases, or in certain categories of cases, doing so would 
enable spot-checking to ensure consistency with established norms and allow 
periodic reevaluation of those norms.242  Fortunately, there are a growing 
number of private sector resources available to help prosecutors take on these 
tasks and make the administrative and financial burdens less onerous.243  
Even if prosecutors are able only to record the data, external actors afforded 
access can help prosecutors analyze it to produce regular reports.244 
B. SOMETIMES MOVE TO PUBLIC, SPARSE 
When should a prosecutor move into one of the top two quadrants on 
the diagram and issue a public declination statement?  In the context of a 
statement that identifies a particular individual as having been the subject or 
target of investigation (or a victim), this move should remain rare.  In any 
circumstance in which the individual has not previously been publicly 
associated with a criminal investigation, the risk to reputational harm by 
issuing a public statement ordinarily would be too great.  Even if the person 
is herself aware of the investigation, a private statement informing her of the 
declination ordinarily should be sufficient for the purposes of closure.  So 
too, a private statement to victims and law enforcement agencies ought to be 
sufficient to further many signaling and accountability interests.  Although a 
public statement might further additional interests, that marginal benefit 
often can be accomplished through other means that do not pose the same 
 
when it comes to cases involving “domestic violence, gang intimidation, or official 
corruption” because such abuses of power are easily hidden from outsiders, while the harms 
they inflict extend “well beyond the injury suffered from specific acts” and “can cripple the 
ability of victims and those around them to flourish as individuals and citizens”). 
 242 See Simon, supra note 109, at 13–14 (describing the value of peer review of 
challenging decisions within organizations, including those chosen from random samples of 
cases). 
 243 A number of organizations are now focused on collecting such data and helping 
prosecutors develop and implement systems to do so as well. See, e.g., FAIR AND JUST 
PROSECUTION (last visited Mar. 15, 2019), https://fairandjustprosecution.org [https://perma.cc
/T5PT-Y9HL]; INSTITUTE FOR INNOVATION IN PROSECUTION (last visited Mar. 15, 2019), http
s://www.prosecution.org/our-mission [https://perma.cc/226B-J6DP]; MEASURES FOR JUSTICE 
(last visited Mar. 15, 2019), https://measuresforjustice.org/about/measures/ [https://perma.cc/
QT9L-4CYH]; see also KUTATELADZE & ANDILORO, supra note 6. 
 244 See Miller & Wright, supra note 10, at 190 (noting the role that “civil society” can play 
in mining prosecutors’ data and organizing it “in ways that allow lawyers and policy actors to 
judge the work of the agency as a while and its individual decisionmakers.”). As David 
Sklansky has written, “outsiders [such as] academic researchers [and] public policy think 
tanks . . . [often] have more experience” than prosecutors do at “collecting and analyzing data, 
and will be more objective in drawing conclusions” from the data. Sklansky, supra note 75, at 
32. Thus, he suggests, prosecutors “should invite them in.” Id. 
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risk of reputational harm to the target of the investigation, victims, and 
witnesses. 
But when an investigation has been in the public eye, the calculus is 
different.  To begin, the target of the investigation may seek a public 
statement from the prosecutor in order to begin the process of repairing 
reputational harm that has already occurred.  The public interest in the matter 
also may be such that accountability interests weigh heavily in favor a public 
statement acknowledging the declination.  There may be a benefit in 
signaling to the public and press (and other investigatory bodies) that the time 
for other avenues of redress has come, without intruding on a criminal 
investigation.  When there is no specific law enforcement risk associated with 
doing so (such as an ongoing investigation), the balance of interests and risks 
then may tilt toward a public declination statement, at least one in the top left 
quadrant (public, sparse).  Such a statement might indicate that an 
investigation which was previously reported has concluded without the filing 
of charges. 
To minimize concerns about the prosecutor’s ability to reopen the case 
if new information is developed, prosecutors could include standard language 
about the non-binding nature of the declination, much as prosecutors attach 
language to press releases announcing the filing of charges, which indicate 
the charges are merely an accusation and the defendant is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.245  Although such language may be awkward in some 
circumstances (e.g. where it is not reasonably foreseeable that further 
investigation will ensue), its inclusion in all declination statements may 
usefully forestall questions about its significance in any particular case or 
impact on future cases. 
How much prior publicity is sufficient to warrant a public, sparse 
declination statement is hard to determine ex ante.  Here, the policy of the 
DOJ’s Antitrust Division, discussed supra, is instructive.246  It provides that 
“[i]n general, the more publicity the matter has received the more likely it is 
that the Division will issue a statement.”247  If the prosecutor has previously 
acknowledged the investigation publicly, that would be a factor weighing in 
favor of finding the requisite publicity has been established.248 
 
 245 Such language would minimize the risk of prosecutors finding themselves in a situation 
like the one FBI Director Comey faced when new emails were discovered that necessitated 
re-opening the Hillary Clinton email investigation. Had the initial declination announcement 
contained such a caveat, Director Comey might not have felt the need to send his subsequent 
letter to Congress about the new turn of events. See supra note 135. 
 246 See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
 247 See id. 
 248 See id. 
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But publicity alone should not be the only factor in determining whether 
to issue even a sparse, public declination statement.  It is a necessary, but not 
sufficient, condition.  Such a statement also should serve significant signaling 
or accountability interests, or both.  These interests generally will be 
strongest when certain other factors are present, such as (1) the target of an 
investigation is a public figure; (2) the case involved allegations of official 
misconduct; or (3) questions may be raised about the prosecutor’s conflict of 
interest or malfeasance.249  That is because these cases tend to raise the 
greatest concern about preferential treatment (e.g. for public officials, police, 
celebrities, donors, or relatives) or a prosecutor’s lack of commitment or 
competency in a particular area (e.g. domestic abuse; police use of force 
cases).  Accountability interests are particularly salient when two or more of 
these factors are present (e.g. a public official accused of official misconduct, 
such as corruption or excessive use of force).  These factors also may counsel 
in favor of a public, detailed declination statement, as discussed further 
below. 
C. RARELY MOVE TO PUBLIC, DETAILED 
Assuming the requisite publicity to justify any public statement at all, 
when should a prosecutor provide a detailed declination statement?  Here, 
the risk of reputational harm is greatest, even if the investigation previously 
was publicly reported or confirmed.  So too, the more detail a prosecutor 
provides, the greater the risk of disclosing information detrimental to 
ongoing or future law enforcement efforts, and of later being proven wrong 
on the facts.  When statements openly acknowledge the exercise of discretion 
in the truest sense, they also render a prosecutor vulnerable to political attack 
and pressure to act more punitively in the future.  Accordingly, detailed 
statements are warranted only where their value (i.e., the extent to which they 
further signaling, accountability, or history-keeping interests) in the context 
of the individual case is unusually high.  When that threshold is crossed is 
difficult to define with precision, but the analysis is not dissimilar to the 
framework already familiar to law enforcement agencies in other contexts, 
such as responding to Freedom of Information Act requests for information 
 
 249 For a thorough discussion of why cases in which police officers are targets invariably 
raise concerns about local prosecutors’ conflict of interest, or at least the appearance of such 
conflicts, see Levine, supra note 106. Other circumstances in which a prosecutor’s impartiality 
might be subject to question include cases where the head prosecutor overruled the 
recommendation of career prosecutors, or a defense lawyer involved in the case donated to the 
prosecutor’s campaigns. 
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in their files.250  Even then, prosecutors should consider whether that value 
can be sufficiently achieved through other means that do not pose the same 
risks, such as de-identified case summaries or aggregate reports issued at 
some later date. 
In widely publicized cases involving public figures, allegations of 
official misconduct, or where questions may be raised about the prosecutor’s 
conflict of interest or malfeasance, a sparse declination statement may not be 
sufficient to serve accountability interests because it will not provide 
sufficient context for outsiders to evaluate the prosecutor’s decision.  Thus, 
for example, when prosecutors decide not to bring charges in police use of 
force cases because of insufficient evidence, or because in their judgment 
criminal charges are not warranted, they should be willing to so 
acknowledge.251  So too, such circumstances may provide unique “teachable 
moments” in which prosecutors can convey important information about the 
law and its limits to an audience that is paying attention, thus heightening the 
pedagogical value of such statements.252  History-keeping interests also are 
strongest in cases involving public officers engaged in official misconduct 
(examples of which might include not only police use of force cases, but 
municipal authorities’ failure to maintain a safe water supply).  In such cases, 
there is value not only in communicating (thoroughly) the prosecutor’s 
declination decision, but also the facts uncovered during the investigation.  
The more extensive and complex the investigation, the greater the history-
keeping interests are likely to be. 
If the foregoing factors weigh in favor of a public, detailed declination 
statement, then prosecutors also should consider whether there are other 
available mechanisms to further the same interests.  As discussed further 
 
 250 See, e.g., DOJ v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989) 
(outlining process for determining whether information in law enforcement records may be 
withheld from FOIA request under FOIA Exemption 7(C)); see also DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FOIA 
GUIDE, 2004 EDITION, EXEMPTION 7(C) (last updated July 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/
oip/foia-guide-2004-edition-exemption-7c [perma.cc/7323-YW4J] (“Under the traditional 
Exemption 7(C) analysis, once a privacy interest has been identified and its magnitude has 
been assessed, it is balanced against the magnitude of any recognized public interest that 
would be served by disclosure”). 
 251 Taking ownership of such decisions is far preferable to a prosecutor obfuscating the 
extent to which he or she has evaluated the merits of a case, as appeared to be the case with 
the Ferguson, Missouri on-duty police shooting of Michael Brown. See, e.g., Ben 
Trachtenberg, No, You Stand Up: Why Prosecutors Should Stop Hiding Behind Grand Juries, 
80 MO. L. REV. 1099 (2015) (criticizing St. Louis County Prosecutor Robert P. McCulloch for 
evading accountability for his own decision by submitting the case against police officer 
Darren Wilson to the Grand Jury). 
 252 See supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the value of a few politically 
salient public statements). 
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below, prosecutors may have other tools at their disposal to achieve much of 
the same value.  Also, other institutions may be capable of taking up some of 
this work, especially history-keeping.  When, after considering all of the 
above, prosecutors decide to proceed with a public, detailed declination 
statement, they should avoid statements that suggest blame or wrongdoing 
on the part of the target of an investigation, witnesses, or victims.  Such 
statements pose considerable risk to the reputational interests of the persons 
thus characterized, who will not have the opportunity to contest them in a 
judicial forum.  Moreover, any marginal value of such comments in 
promoting the interests served by declination statements is vastly outweighed 
by these reputational risks.  Thus, when prosecutors provide details to 
support their declinations, they should strive for a neutral tone, letting the 
facts speak for themselves.253 
Resisting calls for more public statements in individual cases or for 
more information may be difficult at times, especially for elected 
prosecutors.  But having a framework to draw upon in deciding when 
information will be released can help, especially when prosecutors share that 
framework with the public, including the rationale for withholding 
information in the vast majority of cases.  As Onora O’Neil has observed, it 
is “deception rather than secrecy” that promotes distrust.254  Thus, when a 
prosecutor straightforwardly states that she will not say anything more about 
a particular declination decision because of longstanding policy against 
doing so (and explains the important interests advanced by that policy), she 
may frustrate outsiders, but she is not necessarily undermining their trust in 
her.  That is likely to be particularly so if the prosecutor is able to point to 
other sources of information that convey the range of situations in which the 
prosecutor has exercised her discretion not to charge and through which the 
prosecutor has rendered herself accountable for those decisions as a whole, 
as discussed further in the next section.255 
 
 253 Again, the DOJ Antitrust Division Guidelines on closing statements are instructive. 
They provide that “[n]o disparaging characterizations of individuals or organizations will be 
included in the statement.” See supra note 173. 
 254 ONORA O’NEILL, A QUESTION OF TRUST 72 (2002). 
 255 As Mark Fenster has observed, “[S]ecrecy can be defensible and even justifiable within 
a framework for accountable secrecy—secrecy whose existence is made public and regulated 
by democratic procedures that allow the [institution] to be held democratically accountable 
for the secrets it keeps.” MARK FENSTER, THE TRANSPARENCY FIX: SECRETS, LEAKS, AND 
UNCONTROLLABLE GOVERNMENT INFORMATION (2017) (citing Dennis F. Thompson, 
Democratic Secrecy, 114 POL. SCI. Q. 181 (1999)) (emphasis in original). 
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D. CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES 
Before committing to a public, detailed declination statement, 
prosecutors should consider what other means are available that might serve 
the same interests while posing fewer risks.  Two of the chief alternatives 
(aggregate reports and de-identified case summaries) draw upon internal 
resources.  The third, the inclusion of other fact-finding institutions, requires 
that prosecutors look outward to consider whether there are other institutions 
capable of accomplishing similar aims. 
1. Data and Reports 
Many of the signaling and accountability interests discussed in Part I 
could be furthered by prosecutors’ use of internal declination records to 
generate data and reports for external audiences.  For example, such reports 
provide a vehicle for communicating to different political constituencies the 
kinds of cases that were declined, at what rates, and why—thus promoting 
prosecutors’ own accountability as well as that of legislators and agencies 
when they bear some of the responsibility.  What is lost in terms of assessing 
the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in any one case might be more than 
made up by the availability of information about the prosecutors’ 
declinations overall, which provide important context.256  In fact, aggregate 
data and reports may be superior to individual statements because they offer 
a fuller picture of how prosecutors have exercised their discretion across 
entire categories of cases, while posing fewer concerns about fairness.257  To 
the extent that prosecutors present not just raw data, but a narrative account 
of what the data signifies in terms of their performance, such reporting is 
even more useful.  As Onora O’Neill has written, “intelligent accountability” 
is not about metrics or “a set of stock performance indicators.”258  Rather, 
“[t]hose who are called to account should give an account of what they have 
done, and of their successes or failures, to others who have sufficient time 
and experience to assess the evidence and report on it.”259  Moreover, such 
reports provide an important opportunity for prosecutors to signal that they 
 
 256 See Tazlitz & Henderson, supra note 79, at 225 (noting that “[t]he easiest 
accountability mechanisms to justify are those requiring public reporting and periodic review” 
of “composite statistics,” such as those already required by law in a variety of contexts, such 
as the number of wiretaps conducted each year). 
 257 See Simon, supra note 109, at 18 (“Public accountability seems most productive and 
least dangerous to fairness values when it focuses on general patterns of practice rather than 
individual decisions.”). 
 258 O’NEILL, supra note 254, at 58 (emphasis in original). 
 259 Id. 
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view declinations as a crucial part of their role and to educate the public about 
this aspect of the prosecutorial function.260 
2. De-Identified Case Summaries 
Prosecutors also could employ de-identified case summaries to 
accomplish many of the accountability and pedagogical interests discussed 
in Part I.  That is, prosecutors could periodically publish information about 
cases that include discussion of the relevant facts, law, and other factors that 
influenced the prosecutor’s exercise of discretion, but redact any identifying 
information about the targets, victims, and witnesses.  This option would 
approximate the value of public, detailed declination statements in many 
respects, while avoiding most of their risks.261  In fact, their pedagogical 
value would be greater than identified statements, because they could be 
more detailed and more frequently released, thus more completely conveying 
critical aspects of the law and prosecutors’ interpretation and application of 
it.  They also could provide useful context in which to evaluate a prosecutor’s 
charging decision in any particular case that comes under scrutiny. 
3. Other Fact-Finding Institutions 
Finally, prosecutors should consider whether there are other institutions 
capable of serving the history-keeping interests that a public, detailed 
declination can provide.  In most U.S. jurisdictions, grand juries will not be 
a candidate for this role.  But there are a few where, consistent with their 
more comprehensive historical role,262 grand juries still are authorized to 
 
 260 By way of example, although not required to by law, in King County, Washington, 
State’s Attorney Dan Satterberg publishes such an annual report on his decisions to try 
individuals under the age of eighteen as adults or juveniles, a matter over which prosecutors 
have considerable discretion. See DAN SATTERBERG & RONALD WRIGHT, PROSECUTION THAT 
EARNS COMMUNITY TRUST 5 (Nov. 2018). 
 261 For example, in FCPA cases, the Department of Justice has adopted an opinion-letter 
procedure whereby companies can request an opinion from DOJ as to whether prospective 
conduct would lead to an enforcement action. DOJ publishes these letters on its website 
without disclosing the identity of the requesting party or any of the actors involved. See DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, OPINION PROCEDURE RELEASES (last updated June 17, 2015), https://www.justice
.gov/criminal-fraud/opinion-procedure-releases [https://perma.cc/75JR-F5JQ]. Because these 
letters refer only to prospective conduct, they differ from the kind of anonymized declination 
letter suggested herein, which would describe conduct that a party actually engaged in which 
resulted in a declination. But the pedagogical value would be similar. 
 262 See generally RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1634–1941 (1963) (discussing history of grand juries in the United States, 
which included greater direct citizen involvement and independence from prosecutors); Peter 
L. Davis, Rodney King and the Decriminalization of Police Brutality in America: Direct and 
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deliver a fact-finding report in certain circumstances, usually those involving 
official misconduct.263  For example, in 1974 a federal grand jury in the 
District of Columbia issued a report (now known as the Watergate “road 
map”) detailing the evidence of misconduct against President Nixon and his 
associates.264  That report was not released publicly at the time, but (with 
court approval) was transmitted to Congress.265  In New York, a state grand 
jury issued a 170-page report in the Tawana Brawley scandal of 1987, which 
involved allegations of police and prosecutorial misconduct.266  And in 2019, 
a Pennsylvania state grand jury issued a comprehensive report about sex 
abuse in the Catholic Church that spanned decades.267 
Grand jury reports are in some ways superior to prosecutorial 
declination statements.  To begin, they are generally authorized only in cases 
deemed by the legislature to be of the greatest public interest, such as those 
involving public corruption.268  They also offer the advantage of providing 
some external check on prosecutors’ narrative of events, since such reports, 
even if drafted by the prosecutor, must be endorsed by the grand jury.  
Moreover, before such reports may become public, review by the district 
court may be required to ensure that the report is supported by a 
preponderance of the evidence developed in the course of the 
 
Judicial Access to the Grand Jury as Remedies for Victims of Police Brutality When the 
Prosecutor Declines to Prosecute, 53 MD. L. REV. 271, 299–306 (1994). 
 263 See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND JURY: AN 
INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 31–32 (1977) (noting that “[m]any states prohibit grand jury reports” 
and where they are permitted, they generally are limited to situations involving “publicly 
elected officials” rather than “purely private activity,” and where there is express statutory 
authority to issue such a report). 
 264 See Spencer S. Hsu, U.S. Archivists Release Watergate Report That Could Be Possible 
“Road Map” for Mueller, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2018), https://nationalpost.com/news/world/
u-s-archivists-release-watergate-report-that-could-be-a-possible-road-map-for-robert-mueller
-on-trump [https://perma.cc/VCW5-XLVD]. 
 265 See In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning 
Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219 (D.D.C. 1974). 
 266 See STATE OF NEW YORK, COUNTY OF DUTCHESS, REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT (1988), https://archive.org/stream/TawanaBrawleyGrandJuryReport/tawana
_brawley_archive_djvu.txt [https://perma.cc/LH4X-2U97]; see also We, The Grand Jury: 
Text of Its Conclusions in the Tawana Brawley Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1988, at B4 
(reprinting key findings of the grand jury). 
 267 See supra note 142. 
 268 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3333(a) (authorizing grand jury reports in cases involving 
misconduct by public officers or employees or organized crime); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4542 
(limiting investigative grand jury reports to cases involving organized, public corruption, or 
“proposing recommendations for legislative, executive, or administrative action in the public 
interest based upon stated findings”). 
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investigation.269  Thus, the ensuing report may be more accurate than a 
statement reviewed only in the prosecutor’s office.  Some laws authorizing 
grand jury reports also provide built-in mechanisms for the protection of 
privacy, such as advance notice to those named in the report and judicial 
review, so that those named can petition a court to block the report’s release 
or for redactions.270  Finally, because grand jury reports are issued in the 
name of the grand jury, pursuant to express authorization, they do not raise 
the same questions about legitimacy and overreach that may be lodged 
against prosecutorial declination statements that are public and detailed. 
In addition to grand juries, other institutions also may be available to 
probe the facts of important events and make public their findings.  For 
example, Texas and Washington use lay jurors to hear evidence and answer 
interrogatories about their findings in a procedure known as an inquest, 
which does not involve prosecutors or any determination of guilt or 
liability.271  These are frequently used to investigate deaths involving on-duty 
law enforcement officers.272  And the United States military uses a 
mechanism called a Board of Inquiry to determine the facts of significant 
events.  This procedure is independent of the Court Martial process, the 
military’s equivalent to criminal trials.273  Regulatory agencies also may have 
the authority and even superior expertise to determine the facts surrounding 
high-impact events like public health or infrastructure disasters. 
Legislative oversight committees also could provide the requisite 
accounting.  For example, during the Watergate era, the public learned what 
transpired not from the grand jury report, but through the televised hearings 
held by a bipartisan congressional committee, which later issued its own 
report summarizing the evidence.274  Similarly, in 2019, notwithstanding the 
fact that Mueller Report covered much of the same ground, the bipartisan 
Senate Select Intelligence Committee issued a two-volume report detailing 
 
 269 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3333(b)(1); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4552(b). 
 270 See 18 U.S.C. § 3333(c); 42 Pa. CONS. STAT. § 4552(e). The federal statute also 
provides that public grand jury reports may not be “critical of an identified person” who is not 
a public officer or employee. 18 U.S.C. § 3333(b)(2). 
 271 See Steve Miletich, Review Finds Seattle Police Shooting of Che Taylor Fell Within 
Department Policy, SEATTLE TIMES (June 28, 2016), https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-ne
ws/crime/review-finds-seattle-police-shooting-of-che-taylor-fell-within-department-policy/ [
https://perma.cc/ND69-84RU]. 
 272 Id. 
 273 DEP’T OF NAVY, PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND BOARDS OF INQUIRY, http://
www.jag.navy.mil/library/instructions/5830_1A.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3LW-NA5G]. 
 274 See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, 93RD CONG., 
FINAL REPORT OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES 
(Comm. Print 1974). 
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Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election.275  Such hearings 
and reports have a long history in the United States.276  Legislatures also can 
appointed independent commissions, such as the 9/11 Commission,277 to 
make findings of fact and generate recommendations for reform.278 
In cases that have attracted extraordinary public attention, advocacy 
organizations and the press may also be able to fulfill some of this function, 
including by obtaining information in the prosecutors’ files pursuant to 
Freedom of Information Act requests.  Finally, civil enforcement authorities 
may be enlisted to help serve this function, some co-located within the same 
offices as prosecutors. For example, state Attorneys General and many units 
of the DOJ, including United States Attorneys’ Offices, have civil 
enforcement authority.  In circumstances where prosecutors have decided 
that criminal charges are not appropriate, a civil action could further 
important history-keeping interests (in addition to providing a measure of 
accountability for wrongdoers) by providing a public forum in which to tell 
the story about what happened, through the filing of a complaint and eventual 
civil trial or settlement process.279 
 
 275 See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REPORT OF THE SELECT 
COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES 
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When no other institution is available to engage in fact-finding or will 
not be able to do so quickly enough to satisfy a pressing public need for 
information, the rationale for prosecutors to issue a public, detailed 
declination statement is at its highest.  But such circumstances ought to arise 
rarely.  Moreover, thinking about them as a category ex ante should prompt 
prosecutors, policy makers, and legislatures to consider whether we want 
prosecutors to serve as history-keepers, or whether, alternatively, we should 
invest in creating and supporting a diversity of institutions capable of 
performing that task outside of the criminal justice system. 
CONCLUSION 
As important as prosecutors’ decisions to bring criminal charges are 
prosecutors’ decisions not to charge.  But historically prosecutors have not 
talked much about this critical part of their role.  Prosecutors’ failure to 
communicate about their exercise of negative discretion is unfortunate, as it 
leaves the public with an incomplete understanding of the prosecutorial 
function and other important information, including the content of the law 
and prosecutors’ priorities.  It also undermines the ability of the public and 
other institutions to hold prosecutors accountable for their exercise of 
discretion, and to hold accountable the other institutional actors who share 
with prosecutors the authority and responsibility for criminal law 
enforcement.  Although generally there are good reasons not to discuss 
individual cases in which a prosecutor has declined to charge, those reasons 
do not support a blanket refusal by prosecutors to discuss declinations at all.  
To the contrary, there is much to be gained from talking about declinations, 
which this Article has described as signaling, accountability, and history-
keeping interests.  But because there are significant risks attached, 
particularly privacy and reputational risks, in the context of individual cases, 
statements about declinations must be made with forethought rather than on 
an ad hoc basis or defensively. 
This Article offers a framework to help prosecutors do just that.  It 
encourages prosecutors to consider the interests that would be served by 
issuing a declination statement in a particular manner, the risks that would be 
posed thereby, and whether alternatives are available that would serve those 
interests at lesser risk.  It enlarges the frame of declination statements to 
include not only the occasional public statement in a high-profile case, but 
also other kinds of statements about declinations, such as aggregate reports 
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and de-identified case summaries, that can convey much of the same 
information and accomplish many of the same objectives, only better.  Such 
practices not only serve important interests in signaling and accountability, 
but they also provide necessary context in the rare circumstance in which a 
prosecutor decides to issue a detailed, public statement in an individual case.  
Finally, the framework invites prosecutors to consider what other institutions 
are available to engage in fact-finding and the reconstruction of past events 
when the need for such a narrative is pressing.  Assisted by this framework, 
prosecutors can intentionally and effectively communicate about 
declinations. 
